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A. Preliminary Remarks
On 2 October 2013, Protocol No. 16 to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)
was opened for signature by the Member States of the Council of Europe (CoE). The
protocol, that has so far been signed by sixteen States and ratified by Albania, Georgia,
Lithuania, San Marino and Slovenia,' will enter into force in case of ratification by at least
ten Member States. If the protocol becomes effective, it will expand the European Court of
Human Rights' competence to give advisory opinionS upon request by domestic high
courts and tribunals.
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Irene Spigno for Section D. The introduction (Section A) and the conclusion (Section E) were written jointly by the
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1 According to the chart of signatures and ratifications, as of 20 April 2015 and since the date of opening for
signatures, Albania, Armenia, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway,
Romania, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Turkey, and Ukraine had signed Protocol no. 16, while Albania, Georgia,
Lithuania, San Marino, and Slovenia also ratified it.
2 Prior to the adoption of the protocol, a very limited advisory competence was already conferred on the Court,
on the basis of Article 47 ECHR. However, an advisory opinion could be requested only by the Committee of
Ministers and could be delivered by the Court only on issues not involving the interpretation of the rights
provided in the Convention. The strong limits, ratione personae as well as ratione materiae, in order to request
and obtain an opinion, made the clause ineffective: in fact, since the adoption of the Convention, the Court has
only delivered two opinions re Article 47. On this point, see Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou & Noreen O'Meara, Advisory
Jurisdiction and the European Court of Human Rights: A Magic Bullet for dialogue and docket-control?, 3 LEGAL
STUDs. 444-68 (2014).
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Indeed, the aim of the protocol is to guarantee greater involvement of domestic judges in
the Convention system. It aims at securing the correct interpretation and implementation
of Convention rights through a strong interaction with the European Court of Human
Rights (ECtHR). The protocol, in fact, is perfectly in line with the final telos of the ECHR and
of the CoE in general, which was established in the aftermath of one of the most brutal
conflicts in world history in order to provide legal mechanisms for the implementation of
the principles of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.
However, there is a danger that a mechanism established to fulfill such prominent
objectives might collide with some concrete problematic aspects, concerning, in particular,
the interaction between national and supranational judicial systems. The fulfillment of
these objectives might be frustrated by possible conflicts over the competences of
ordinary and Constitutional Courts, at the domestic level, as well as between constitutional
judges and the ECtHR, and over the complex triangular relationship between Constitutional
Courts, the ECtHR, and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), at the
supranational level. In particular, the reaction of Constitutional Courts is a matter of
concern. This is particularly so given that these Courts have, since the end of the Second
World War, been considered to be the main actors in the protection of fundamental rights
in Europe, and are now sidelined by supranational courts and by the direct relationship the
latter have either with ordinary judges or citizens.
In the following article it is argued that, on the one hand, and also in the light of the
experience accrued within other supranational systems, Protocol No. 16 could represent a
challenge for Constitutional Courts' autonomy when dealing with constitutional review of
legislation. This is because the advisory opinion mechanism might trigger a centralization in
the interpretation of fundamental rights enshrined in the ECHR in the hands of the ECtHR -
fundamental rights that are likewise enshrined in national Constitutions. On the other
hand, the effective enforcement of the new mechanism largely relies on the attitude that
will be shown by national courts, first of all by constitutional judges, as well as the ECtHR
itself in using this device. In the end, not only are the Contracting Parties of the ECHR free
to decide on whether to sign Protocol No. 16 and to determine which national courts
constitute "highest courts and tribunals," but the (authorized) national judges also enjoy
discretion about the extent to which they want to resort to the ECtHR's advisory opinions.
In other words, the degree of engagement in the European judicial conversation depends
primarily on national Constitutional Courts and on the extent to which they see themselves
As stated by the judges of the European Court of Human Rights-and in particular by Frangois Tulkens, vice-
President of the European Court of Human Rights at that time-at a Seminar held in Strasbourg, on 27 January
2012, How can we ensure greater involvement of national courts in the Convention system? The report of the
seminar is available on the ECtHR's website at http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Dialogue_2012_ENG.pdf.
Among the scholars, see Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos, L'6largissement de la compdtence consultative de la Cour
europdenne des droits de l'homme-A propos du Protocole no 16 a la Convention europdenne des droits de
l'homme 97 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME 9-29 (2014).
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as "agents" shaping European constitutional space.4 The attitude of the ECtHR, in terms of
its activism or, rather, self-restraint, in exploiting the requests for advisory opinions for
strengthening its authoritative interpretation of the ECHR, can also make a critical
difference.
However, for a Constitutional Court that decides to use the new mechanism, it might be
difficult for it to disregard the opinion of the ECtHR, as well as the opinions rendered to
other Courts on the same grounds and on similar factual situations. Given the dominant
model of centralized review of legislation in Europe, this could limit the inclination of a
Constitutional Court to employ the advisory opinion mechanism extensively.
Nevertheless, it cannot be neglected that Protocol No. 16 has the merit to support, at least
formally, the strengthening of the relationship between the ECtHR and the highest
domestic judges, albeit that it does so only in one direction. For whilst national courts seek
guidance from the ECtHR on the interpretation of ECHR rights, the ECtHR cannot seek
guidance from national Constitutional Courts on the interpretation of the same rights
under national Constitutions.
This article aims to analyze both the strengths and the weaknesses of the new mechanism
introduced by Protocol No. 16. It attempts to foresee what the attitude of Constitutional
Courts vis-h-vis the new advisory opinions could be, by drawing inspiration from a
comparative analysis with the practices of the preliminary reference procedure by
Constitutional Courts before the CJEU and with the advisory opinion mechanism of the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights (ICHR). The article proceeds as follows. Section B
considers the practice of judicial interaction between domestic courts and the ECtHR. It
starts from the context in which the "dialogue protocol" was drafted-a context
characterized by the changing role of domestic judges in the control of conventionality and
in the relationship with Constitutional Courts, in particular where constitutional review of
legislation is centralized, as in most European countries. Section C then analyzes the
differences and similarities of the new ECtHR advisory opinion mechanism in the light of
the EU preliminary reference procedure, aiming to highlight the potential reception of the
former by Constitutional Courts. Section D focuses on the jurisdiction of the ICHR to render
advisory opinions upon referral by national authorities, as a case study that can allow for
some predictions regarding the foreseeable impact of Protocol No. 16 to the ECHR on
Constitutional Courts. Finally, Section E sets out the conclusions of this Article, and
considers the results of the comparative analysis.
4 On this point, see Marta Cartabia, Europe as a Space of Constitutional Interdependence: New Questions about
the Preliminary Ruling, in this Special Issue.
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B. Protocol no. 16 to the European Convention on Human Rights: A New Role for
Domestic Judges?
I. The Evolving Role of Domestic Judges in the Convention System
The expansion of the role of domestic judges in the implementation of the ECHR, through
interaction among judges as well as with the ECtHR, was already underway before the
adoption of the protocol. After all, this was a legal requirement of the principle of
subsidiarity, which is one of the cornerstones of the entire ECHR system.s Indeed,
considering the universal dimension of human rights and the "dialogue" that is in place
among judges, eminent authors have defined the Convention system as a pluralist6 and
cosmopolitan legal order. According to those scholars, in this new and complex system,
the relationship between institutions and sources of law is no longer based on the principle
of hierarchy, but rather follows, on the contrary, the principle of heterarchy ("an
interaction of different sub-orders that is not subject to common legal rules but takes a
more open, political form""), in which the judges play a central role.
However, the existing legal order is far from being perfect; it is based on a general principle
the implementation of which is reserved mainly to informal and voluntary mechanisms.
Indeed, it cannot be denied that domestic judges are the masters of the correct
interpretation and implementation of fundamental rights, through mechanisms such as
judicial interpretation and, in more problematic cases, review of domestic legislation,
taking the ECHR as a standard. When performing these functions, domestic judges are
often engaged in a dialogue with the European Court, whose case law is taken as a
benchmark for the correct interpretation of fundamental rights. However, this dialogue is
mainly indirect, is often hidden,9 and is completely based on the will of national judges,
who can deliberately decide to avoid any confrontation with the European judge.
According to Artcile 35(1) ECHR, "The Court may only deal with the matter after all domestic remedies have
been exhausted, according to the generally recognized rules of international law, and within a period of six
months from the date on which the final decision was taken." This principle is even reinforced by the recently
adopted Protocol no. 15 to the European Convention on Human Rights.
6 On pluralism in the Convention system, see Nico Krish, The Open Architecture of European Human Rights Law,
11 LSE LAw, SOCIETY AND ECONOMY WORKING PAPERS (2007).
7On the ECHR as a cosmopolitan legal order, with the European Court as a "Constitutional Court," see Alec Stone
Sweet, A Cosmopolitan Legal Order: Constitutional Pluralism and Rights Adjudication in Europe, 1 GLOBAL
CONSTITUTIONALISM 53-90 (2012).
8 Nico Krish, The Case for Pluralism in Postnational Law, 12 LSE LAw, SOCIETYAND ECONOMY WORKING PAPERS 2 (2009).
On the cases of hidden or "implied" dialogue, see Rafael Bustos Gisbert, XV Proposiciones generales para una
teoria de los di6logos judiciales, 95 REVISTA ESPANOLA DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL 30-31 (2012). Although "hidden,"
this still amount to a form of engagement according to VICKY JACKSON, CONSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT IN A
TRANSNATIONAL ERA Chapter 3 (2013).
1390 Vol. 16 No. 06
The Prospective Role of Constitutional Courts
In this light, this section aims to explore Protocol No. 16, not only as the first formal
instrument of direct interaction between domestic judges and the ECtHR, but also as a new
mechanism that can produce indirect effects on the existing functions of judges, and on
the dialogue among them, for the reinforcement of fundamental rights in Europe. In
analyzing the possible effects of the protocol on the system already in place, it can be
observed that, despite the fact that the introduction of the protocol must be considered an
undeniably crucial step in the process of the expansion of a culture of "European rights,"
important problems nevertheless remain unresolved. In particular, the mechanism of
judicial referral to the European Court in order to obtain advisory opinions risks adding
further complexity to an already complex landscape. In this context, the realization of the
risk of confusion between the functions of ordinary and constitutional courts, to the
detriment of the role of Constitutional courts, could be one of the major shortcomings.
IL The "Dialogue Protocol"
As was hoped for by scholars quite a long time ago, 10 at the 2012 Brighton Conference it
was stated that:
The Conference... notes that the interaction between
the Court and national authorities could be
strengthened by the introduction into the Convention
of a further power of the Court, which States Parties
could optionally accept, to deliver advisory opinions
upon request on the interpretation of the Convention
in the context of a specific case at domestic level.
The idea that the correct implementation and interpretation of fundamental rights at the
domestic level is strictly connected with a well-balanced cooperation between domestic
judges and the ECtHR emerges clearly. Indeed, on the basis of these general principles, the
Preamble to Protocol No. 16 states that the power to give advisory opinions upon judicial
referral aims to "further enhance the interaction between the Court and national
authorities and thereby reinforce implementation of the Convention, in accordance with
the principle of subsidiarity." 1 2
10 Frangoise Benoit-Rohmer, Les perspectives de reformes a long terme de la Cour Europeenne des droits de
I'homme: "certiorari versus renvoiprejudiciel" REVUE UNIVERSELLE DES DROITS DE ['HOMME 7-8 (2002).
11 Brighton Declaration, 12.d.
12 Protocol No. 16 to the ECHR, Preamble.
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Therefore, with the aim of strengthening the dialogue between domestic judges and the
ECtHR, Article 1.1 of the Protocol confers to the "highest courts and tribunals of a High
Contracting Party" the power to "request the Court to give advisory opinions." The courts
authorized to refer shall be indicated by each Contracting Party, by means of a declaration
that shall be submitted at the time of the signature or ratification of the protocol. The
declaration is not binding, since Parties retain the power to modify it at any time.13
The jurisdictions authorized to seek an advisory opinion should be involved in a pending
process.14 This means that among the authorities indicated by the Contracting Parties, only
those effectively exercising judicial power in the context of a pending process can seek an
opinion from the ECtHR. Therefore, the referral has a concrete nature, with abstract
review of legislation not being allowed.s
The decision of the ECtHR regarding judicial referral is not considered to be the last stage
of domestic controversies. Its aim, rather, is to give an opinion only on "questions of
principle relating to the interpretation or application" of the ECHR rights and freedoms.
Here, the analogy with the power of referral of tribunals to Constitutional Courts in the
majority of the European systems of constitutional review of legislation is evident.
Moreover, even the task of interpreting the legal issues concerning fundamental rights
protected under the ECHR is not left entirely to the ECtHR, for the decision of the Court is
to be based on the legal and factual background of the pending case provided by the
17domestic jurisdiction. This means that even the question of interpretation is not to be
simply transferred to the ECtHR, but is to be solved on the basis of the interaction between
the "preliminary" interpretation of the domestic judge and the "final" interpretation of the
ECtHR. To this end, the domestic judge is to present, in particular: (i) the subject matter of
the domestic case and the relevant findings of fact; (ii) the relevant domestic legal
provisions and the Convention issues raised; (iii) the arguments of the parties; and (iv), the
views of the domestic judge on the question.
13 Art. 10 of the Protocol.
14 Art. 1.2 of the Protocol.
15 See the Explanatory Report to Protocol No. 16 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, point 10,
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Protocol_16_explanatoryreportENG.pdf [hereinafter Explanatory Report].
16 Art. 1.1 of the Protocol, second part.
17 Art. 1.3 of the Protocol.
18 Explanatory Report at point 12.
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When reading the text of Protocol No. 16, therefore, the aim of its drafters to reinforce the
dialogue among judges in the ECHR system emerges clearly. 9 Nevertheless, when
analyzing the possible concrete effects of its implementation, a number of doubts can be
raised as to its ability to fulfill this overarching aim, as will be demonstrated in the
following paragraphs.
///. The Impact of Protocol No. 16 to the European Convention on Human Rights on the
Existing Functions of Judges and Their Interaction with Supranational Judges
In the ECHR system, domestic judges have always had a crucial role in implementing
fundamental rights,20 and, when necessary, in solving the conflictS21 deriving from the
interaction between supranational and national sources of law. In this regard, reviewing
the studies devoted to this phenomenon, it is possible to classify the functions of judges
into two categories: a) interpretation of domestic legislation in conformity with the ECHR
and, in the event that the conflict cannot be solved by interpretative means, b) review of
domestic legislation deemed to conflict with the ECHR. The second mechanism can take
two forms: (i) the control of conventionality, which is usually performed by ordinary
judges, though sometimes also by Constitutional Courts, and (ii) the control of
constitutionality, performed by Constitutional Courts. Protocol No. 16, which adds the
power of domestic courts and tribunals to request advisory opinions from the ECtHR,
introduces a new mechanism of dialogue between national judges and the ECtHR. This,
however, does not appear able to correct the imperfections of the existing system of
judicial interaction.
1. The Impact of Protocol No. 16 on Judicial Interpretation of Domestic Legislation in
Conformity with the Convention
Following the integration of the ECHR into European legal systems, the interpretative
power of domestic judges started to become more relevant.22 Judicial interpretation,
19 It is not by chance that the President of the European Court of Human Rights, Dean Spielmann, in his speeches
defined the protocol as "the dialogue protocol", as pointed out, among the Italian scholars, by E. Nalin, I protocolli
n. 15 e 16 ala Convenzione europea dei diritti dell'uomo, in I GIUDICI DI COMMON LAW E LA (CROSS)FERTILIZATION: I CASI DI
STATI UNITI D'AMERICA, CANADA, UNIONE INDIANA E REGNO UNITO 119-50 (Pamela Martino ed., 2014).
20 Among the Italian scholars, a number of studies by Antonio Ruggeri are devoted to the role of judges in the
multilevel system of fundamental rights. With particular reference to the effects of the adoption of Protocol No.
16 on the expansion of judicial functions, see Antonio Ruggeri, Ragionando sui possibilisviluppi dei rapporti tra le
Corti europee e i giudici nazionali (con specifico riguardo all'adesione dell'Unione al/a Cedu e all'entrata in vigore
del prot. 16), 1 RIVISTA DELL'ASSOCIAZIONE ITALIANA DEI COSTITUZIONALISTI (2014).
21 On the crucial role of conflicts in the EU legal system, see Giuseppe Martinico, The "Polemical" Spirit of
European Constitutional Law: On the Importance of Conflicts in EU Law, in this Special Issue.
22 According to Jan Polakiewicz, "the main responsibility for ensuring the observance of the Convention in
domestic law lies with the legislature and the judiciary." Jan Polakiewicz, The Status of the Convention in National
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indeed, has the power to "create links between legal orders even in the absence of
expressed norms of connection. 23 Among the mechanisms of coordination between
domestic legal systems and the ECHR, consistent judicial interpretation has, therefore,
emerged as one of the most relevant, reflecting a trend similar to that of the coordination
24between national and supranational systems within the European Union.
In some cases, interpretation that is consistent with the ECHR and its jurisprudence is a
duty imposed on national judges by the statutes incorporating the ECHR, 25 as in the case of
26 27the United Kingdom26 and Ireland. In those cases where statutes do not impose such a
judicial duty, Constitutional Courts often introduce this same rule.28 Consequently, both
types of jurisdiction usually take ECHR jurisprudence into consideration, and, as a result,
ECtHR judgments are often quoted by national jurisdictions, even if they concern other
states. In these cases, an obligation to take into account European and international law in
judicial interpretation is usually considered by Constitutional courts to be indirectly based
Law, in FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN EUROPE. THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND ITS MEMBER STATES, 1950-
2000, 31-53 (Robert Blackburn& Jorg Polakiewicz eds., 2001). Alec Stone Sweet and Helen Keller add also
administrative officials. Alec Stone Sweet, Helen Keller, The Reception of the ECHR in National Legal Orders, in A
EUROPE OF RIGHTS. THE IMPACT OF THE ECHR ON NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS, 3-712 (Robert Blackburn& Jorg Polakiewicz
eds., 2008).
23 GIUSEPPE MARTINICO & ORESTE POLLICINO, THE INTERACTION BETWEEN EUROPE's LEGAL SYSTEMS: JUDICIAL DIALOGUE AND THE
CREATION OF SUPRANATIONAL LAWS 6 (2012).
24 In this sense, see Giuseppe Martinico, Is the European Convention Going To Be "Supreme"? A Comparative-
Constitutional Overview of ECHR and EU Law before National Courts, 2 EUR. J. INT'L L. 401-24 (2012).
25 As Martinico points out, Art. 10 of the Spanish Constitution, Art. 20(1) of the Romanian Constitution, and Art. 5
of the Bulgarian Constitution are examples of the constitutional duty to follow the European Convention in
judicial interpretation of national legislation. The case of the UK is an example of legal duty of consistent
interpretation. Martinico, supra note 24,
26 Section 3(1) of the Human Rights Act, indeed, provides that "so far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation
and subordinate legislation must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with the Convention
rights."
27 Section 2.1 of the European Convention on Human Rights Act, in fact, states, "[i]n interpreting and applying any
statutory provision or rule of law, a court shall, in so far as is possible, subject to the rules of law relating to such
interpretation and application, do so in a manner compatible with the State's obligations under the Convention
provisions." In so far as the incorporation of the European Convention into domestic systems is concerned, the
cases of UK and Ireland are considered "relatively 'like cases."' See Samantha Besson, The Reception Process in
Ireland and the United Kingdom, in A EUROPE OF RIGHTS 34-106, supra at note 22.
28 This happens in particular in the Baltic countries. See in particular the cases of Latvia (Constitutional Court,
judgments n. 2000-03-01 of 30 Aug. 2000 and n. 2006-03-0106 of 23 Nov. 2006). All cases are cited by
Martinico, supra note 24.
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on the Constitution, and examples of this include the so-called "hinge provisions" in the
German Basic Law and Article 117 of the Italian Constitution.29
The capacity of the mechanism of consistent judicial interpretation to reinforce the culture
of rights in Europe is more than evident. However, the risk of conflicting interpretations of
the same rights, in some cases even in the same country, is clear. Moreover, this system,
being based only on the will of each court to refer to European standards and case law in
the interpretation of rights, could produce asymmetries. The introduction of the ECtHR's
advisory competence, conferring on the Court a general power to give the "final
interpretation", could offer a solution to these problems. Nevertheless, requesting an
advisory opinion from the ECtHR is not a duty, but a mere right of domestic courts, which
may deliberately decide to forego the "European Court test."
From this perspective, the adoption of Protocol No. 16 does not, therefore, produce any
new positive effects on the existing system of interaction between the jurisprudence of the
European and the domestic courts. This interaction instead remains based on a voluntary
system, the effects of which can vary, depending on the will and the sensitivity of the
actors involved.
However, the picture concerning the effects of the interpretation provided by the ECtHR
on the case law of the domestic courts in case of ratification of the protocol might be more
complicated. Indeed, Article 5 of the Protocol, according to which an advisory opinion,
once adopted, is not binding, must be coordinated with point 27 of the Explanatory
Report, which states that:
They [the advisory opinions] would, however, form
part of the case law of the Court, alongside its
judgments and decisions. The interpretation of the
Convention and the Protocols thereto contained in
such advisory opinions would be analogous in its effect
to the interpretative elements set out by the Court in
judgments and decisions.
Therefore although it is up to the requesting Court to decide on the effects of the opinion
in the pending case,30 it is quite predictable that ECtHR judgments will have a stronger
effect than would be derived from Article 5 of the Protocol-or at least in those cases
29 References to the role of Constitutional Courts in the dialogue with the ECtHR can be found in the reports of the
XVI Conference of the European Constitutional Courts, Vienna, Constitutional Court of Austria, 12-14 May 2014,
devoted to "The cooperation of Constitutional Courts in Europe. Current situation and perspectives" (available at
http://www.confeuconstco.org).
30 Explanatory report at point 25.
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where the ECtHR will adopt a decision on the basis of a "well-established" interpretation of
ECHR rights31 -in a way which is not completely different from the system of judicial
referral to the CJEU (as it will be argued in Section C.IV).
2. The Impact of Protocol No. 16 on the Power of Judges to Review Domestic Legislation
Deemed to Contrast with the Convention
In cases where a sharp conflict arises between the national and the Convention systems,
consistent interpretation would not offer a final solution. In such cases, and where a
stronger approach is needed, the only solution may be to review national legislation
deemed to contrast with the supranational norms.
With the control of conventionality, cases of conflict between national legislation and the
ECHR are solved by "ordinary" domestic judges, who disregard national legislation and
directly apply the ECHR provisions. This mechanism, which is based on the principle of the
direct effect of supranational legislation, is particularly common in monistic countries
where a system of control of constitutionality of legislation is not provided. As a result, in
the hands of ordinary judges, the decentralized system of conventional review of
legislation compensates for the lack of constitutional review of legislation.
32
This is the case, for example, of France until 2008 and the Netherlands. Indeed, in France,
where a posteriori constitutional review of legislation was not provided until the 2008
constitutional reform, the power of domestic judges to exercise the control of
conventionality of domestic legislation, on the basis of Article 55 of the Constitution, has
been recognized by the Conseil constitutionnel itself. However, the Conseil constitutionnel
refused to exercise this power, stating that constitutional judges are provided with the
power of control of constitutionality, while the control of conventionality is reserved to
31 As can be derived by decision no. 49/2015 of the Italian Constitutional Court, according to which Strasbourg
case-law is binding for domestic judges, only when based on an established jurisprudence. While, according to
some authors, the decision is an expression of "constitutional patriotism," intended to put strong limits on judicial
interaction (Antonio Ruggeri, Fissati nuovi paletti dalla consulta a riguardo del rilievo della CEDU in ambito
interno. A prima lettura di Corte cost. n. 49 del 2015, DIRITTO PENALE CONTEMPORANEO (2015),
http://www.penalecontemporaneo.it/upload/1427919457RUGGIERI_2015a.pdf; Diletta Tega, La sentenza della
Corte costituzionale n. 49 del 2015 sulla confisca: il predominio assiologico della Costituzione sulla Cedu, FORUM DI
QUADERNI CONSTITUTIONALI (2015), http://www.forumcostituzionale.it/wordpress/wp-
content/uploads/2015/04/nota_49_2015_tega.pdf), according to others, it is an expression of "functional
disobedience," that is a natural and positive effect of judicial dialogue (Giuseppe Martinico, Corti costituzionali (o
supreme) e "disobbedienza funzionale", DIRITTO PENALE CONTEMPORANEO (2015),
http://www.penalecontemporaneo.it/upload/1430150015MARTINICO_2015.pdf).
32 In France, at least until the 2008 constitutional reform.
Stating that "Treaties or agreements properly ratified or approved shall, upon their publication, have an
authority superior to legislation, provided always that the relevant agreement or treaty is applied by the other
party."
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ordinary judges. As a result, an extensive use of this power followed, firstly by the Court of
Cassation and later also by the Conseil d'Etat, 34 and for a long time the control of
conventionality was the only possible a posteriori review of legislation in France.
The case of the Netherlands is similar. The Constitution itself, while prohibiting any form of
constitutional review of legislation,s provides for the control of conventionality of
domestic legislation. Article 93 thus states that international treaties are binding, and
Article 94 explicitly provides that: "Statutory regulations in force within the Kingdom shall
not be applicable if such application is in conflict with provisions of treaties or of
resolutions by international institutions that are binding on all persons." Judicial review of
conventionality of legislation has, therefore, a constitutional basis in the Netherlands, even
though the courts tend to use this instrument with caution, avoiding excessive interference
with the powers of Parliament.
In Belgium, the evolution of the role of judges with regard to the ECHR reflects the
evolution of the attitude of the State towards international law and the progressive
transformation of constitutional review of legislation in Belgium. Indeed, as far as the
relationship between national and international law is concerned, until 1971 the Belgian
legal system was based on the dualistic theory. However, this trend was reversed following
the adoption, in 1971, by the Supreme Court of Appeal, of the judgment in Franco Suisse Le
Ski, where, for the first time, the direct effect of international treaties was recognized.
From the end of the 1970s onwards, this principle was progressively applied also with
reference to the ECHR. A decentralized system of review of statutes deemed to conflict
with fundamental rights (whose recognition was based on the ECHR) therefore emerged.
This trend reinforced the system of constitutional review of legislation, a power that was
only gradually recognized as pertaining to the Belgian Constitutional Court.
However, the control of conventionality is also exercised by ordinary judges in countries
where there is a system of constitutional review of legislation already in place. In these
cases, control of constitutionality and control of conventionality, with reference to
34 Catherine Dupre, France, in FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN EUROPE, 313-33, supra note 22.
5 Article 120 Const. states, "The constitutionality of Acts of Parliament and treaties shall not be reviewed by the
courts."
3 See Erika De Wet, The Reception Process in the Netherlands and Belgium, in A EUROPE OF RIGHTS, supra note 22,
at 229-309.
After the adoption of the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in the case Marckx v. Belgium.
The competence to review the compatibility of statutes with reference to all fundamental rights was assigned
to the Belgian Cour d'Arbitrage only in 2003. In 2007 its name was changed to Cour Constitutionnelle.
2015 1397
German Law Journal
fundamental rights, coexist. This is the case, for example, of Spain39 and Austria, 40 as well
as of most Central and Eastern European countries, such as Bulgaria,41 Romania, and
Moldova.
Judicial review of legislation in conflict with ECHR rights is very rarely applied in dualistic
countries, as the case of the United Kingdom shows clearly. The Human Rights Act, in fact,
confers upon judges only the power to make a "declaration of incompatibility" between
the statute and the ECHR, while no power of review of legislation with regard to the ECHR
is admitted, according to the principle of Parliamentary sovereignty.42 Even in Italy, judicial
"disapplication" 43 of statutes in contrast with the ECHR-on the model of the mechanism
in force with reference to the EU treaties-has been stopped by the Constitutional Court,
with Decisions no. 348 and 349 of 200744
In all the aforementioned cases, the transformative effect of the ECHR on the role of
judges in domestic legal systems cannot be ignored, even though it must not be
overestimated. 45 Apparently, these judges play the role of "watchdogs" over the correct
implementation and interpretation of fundamental rights, as defined at both national and
supranational levels, and, in performing this function, they sometimes tend to exercise a
quasi-constitutional role. Thus, an evident effect of the ECHR is the great expansion of the
powers of ordinary domestic courts, in many instances to the detriment of Constitutional
Courts.
Article 96.1 Const. states, "Validly concluded international treaties, once officially published in Spain, shall be
part of the internal legal system. Their provisions may only be repealed, amended or suspended in the manner
provided for in the treaties themselves or in accordance with the general rules of international law."
40 Where the European Convention on Human Rights has been incorporated into the Constitution.
41 Article 5(4) Const. provides that "International treaties which have been ratified in accordance with the
constitutional procedure, promulgated and having come into force with respect to the Republic of Bulgaria, shall
be part of the legislation of the State. They shall have primacy over any conflicting provision of the domestic
legislation." However, domestic judges have shown certain self-restraint in the exercise of this power.
42 Robert Blackburn, The UnitedKingdom, in FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN EUROPE, 935-1008, supra note 22.
43 Namely when a domestic statute is not applied to the case but nevertheless remains in force in the legal
system.
44 On the effects of the ICC 2007 judgments, see, critically, Oreste Pollicino, The European Court of Human Rights
and the Italian Constitutional Court: No "Groovy King of Love," in THE UK AND EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS. A STRAINED
RELATIONSHIP?, 361-77 (Katja S Ziegler, Elizabeth Wicks & Loveday Hodson eds., 2015)
45 As Giuseppe Martinico pointed out, on one side, the judges usually make use of the power of "disapplication"
of domestic legislation with caution, and, on the other, in a growing number of countries, Constitutional Courts
are setting constitutional limits on the prevalence of conventional legislation over domestic statues, on the model
of the theory of counter-limits within the EU system. MARTINICO, supra note 24.
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The power to review domestic legislation deemed to conflict with the ECHR has so far been
exercised very rarely by Constitutional Courts. Austria is the most famous example of this.
Austria is a monistic country, whose Constitution does not provide for a bill of rights, and,
since 1964, it has been admitted that in the Austrian legal system the ECHR has
constitutional status. Consequently, conflicts between domestic legislation and the ECHR
can result in a declaration of unconstitutionality by the Federal Constitutional Court, while
possible problems of conflict between the ECHR and the Constitution are solved according
46to the principle lex posteriori derogate legi priori. Constitutional Courts, therefore, seem
to be the main "losers" in the process of the "Europeanization" of rights under the ECHR
system, and the introduction of Protocol No. 16 does not seem to have the power to
reinforce their role, as will be demonstrated in the following paragraph.
IV. Ordinary and Constitutional Courts in the European Convention System: Overlapping
Functions
As an effect of the multiplication of mechanisms of interaction among judges, a process of
gradual overlapping of functions between ordinary and constitutional courts has been
emerging in the ECHR system.47 Indeed, in the absence of any specific rule at the
supranational as well as the national level, both ordinary and Constitutional Courts
spontaneously started to provide consistent interpretation, as well as reviewing domestic
legislation deemed to contrast with the European standards.
In particular, the duty to interpret national legislation in a manner that is consistent with
the ECHR and its jurisprudence is implemented indifferently by ordinary as well as
Constitutional Courts.48The control of conventionality of legislation in contrast with the
ECHR is a power exercised quasi-exclusively by the ordinary courts, while the power of
control of constitutionality in cases of infringement of ECHR rights is very rarely exercised
46 On the effects of the European Convention on Human Rights in the Austrian legal system, see Daniela
Thurnherr, The Reception Process in Austria and Switzerland, in A EUROPE OF RIGHTS, 311-86, supra note 22. On the
consequences of the constitutional status of the European Convention in the Austrian legal system with reference
to the relationship between national legislation and EU legislation, see Andreas Orator, The decision of the
Austrian Verfassungsgerichtshof on the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: an instrument of leverage or rearguard
action?, in this Special Issue.
47 With reference to the EU, as well as the ECHR, Antonio Ruggeri points out the risk of imbalances between
ordinary courts, Constitutional courts and European courts in the system for the protection of fundamental rights
in Europe. See Antonio Ruggeri, Tutela dei diritti fondamentali, squilibri nei rapporti tra giudici comuni, Corte
costituzionale e Corti europee, ricerca dei modi con cui porvi almeno in parte rimedio (2012), available at
www.giurcost.org.
48 References can be found in the reports of the XVI Conference of the European Constitutional Courts, Vienna,
Constitutional Court of Austria, 12-14 May 2014, devoted to "The cooperation of Constitutional Courts in Europe.
Current situation and perspectives" (available at http://www.confeuconstco.org).
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by Constitutional Courts. 49 However, as already stated, considering the similarities with the
decentralized system of control of constitutionality, the effects of control of
conventionality can easily be assimilated to constitutional review of legislation of internal
laws in conflict with the ECHR. As a result, the powers of ordinary and constitutional
courts, in this regard, are clearly overlapping. At the same time, both ordinary and
Constitutional Courts are losing most of their autonomy in deciding cases concerning
fundamental rights. As a result, the role of both ordinary and constitutional judges in the
European system is clearly facing a dramatic transformation.50
In this landscape, it is more than evident that there is a risk of duplication of functions
between the ordinary and Constitutional Courts, with a consequent marginalization of the
role of Constitutional Courts, gradually assimilated to all other apex courts, as well as
asymmetries among CoE countries, due to a number of national variables, including in
particular the approach to supranational law, as well as the rules on the organization of the
judiciary in each legal system.
Protocol No. 16 does not seem to offer a viable solution to these shortcomings. Indeed, as
already mentioned, Article 1.1 of the Protocol refers generically to the "highest courts and
tribunals of a High Contracting Party." 5 This choice is at the same time both exclusive and
inclusive. It is exclusive since not all courts, but only those sitting at the apex of the judicial
system, are authorized to request an advisory opinion. It is inclusive because, as is pointed
out in the explanatory report, the term "highest" (instead of "the highest") refers not only
to constitutional and supreme courts, but also to all those tribunals that "although
inferior... are nevertheless of especial relevance on account of being the "highest" for a
particular category of case." On this basis, it is to be expected that a wide range of
tribunals, including also, but not only, Constitutional courts, would be authorized by the
Contracting Parties to submit a request for an advisory opinion.52
With all this in mind, the request of advisory opinions may, on the one hand, generate
problems of interaction between consultative and adjudicatory functions of the ECtHR (see
49 The Constitutional Court of Austria seems to be the only clear example in this sense.
5o On the transformation of Constitutional Courts in the European legal order, see-among the Italian scholars-
Marina Calamo Specchia, La giustizia costituzionale, un sistema atipico in un ordinamento democratico? Spunti di
riflessione sul ruolo delle Corti nei sistemi costituzionali aperti, in ALLE FRONTIERE DEL DIRITTO COSTITUZIONALE. SCRITTI IN
ONORE DI VALERIO ONIDA (Marilisa D'Amico & Barbara Randazzo eds., 2011).
51 Art. 10 of the Protocol.
52 As can be derived from the choice of Romania that has already indicated the jurisdictions authorized to request
advisory opinions from the European Court: the High Court of Cassation and Justice, the Constitutional Court, as
well as the Courts of Appeal. On the possibility that Constitutional Courts will be likely included, see Oreste
Pollicino, La Corte costituzionale & una "alta giurisdizione nazionale" ai fini della richiesta di parere della Corte
EDU ex Protocollo 16?, 2 DIRITTO DELL'UNIONE EUROPEA 293-315 (2014).
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on this point Sections C and D) and, on the other hand, it may suddenly become a new
"battleground" for competition between different types of courts, fulfilling competing
aims, including, in particular, apex ordinary and Constitutional Courts (see Section C.1l). The
effect, if judges do not show a cooperative attitude, would be one of complicating an
already complex architecture. Within this puzzle, moreover, another piece must also be
taken into account. This is that, in CoE countries which are also members of the EU, all the
aforementioned courts have also to "compete" with the CJEU, as Section C will show.
C. The Mechanism of the Advisory Opinions of the ECtHR from the Viewpoint of
Constitutional Courts: What Can the Experience of the Preliminary Reference Before the
CJEU Tell Us?
At first glance, the procedure devised in Protocol No. 16 appears to generally resemble the
preliminary reference procedure before the CJEU (Article 267 TFEU), whilst departing from
it in some regards.-3 However, to what extent are these two mechanisms comparable from
the viewpoint of Constitutional Courts in EU Member States? In this Section, it is argued
that the effects and impact of these proceedings on Constitutional Courts are largely
dependent on the actual use made by these courts and the ECtHR of Protocol no. 16, and
may well result in Constitutional Courts being further sidelined in the European legal order.
Moreover, should Protocol No. 16 enter into force, the triangular relationships between
Constitutional Courts, the CJEU, and the ECtHR may become even more unpredictable in
their development and more complex for applicants seeking restoration of their rights.
I. The Overall Aim of the Two Mechanisms and the Impact on Constitutional Courts
The aims of the advisory opinion procedure within the ECHR and the preliminary reference
procedure in the EU are apparently very different because of the different telos of each
international/supranational organization. While the former is primarily designed to create
a dialogue between national highest jurisdictions and the ECtHR while the national
proceeding is still underway, so as to guide national judges in interpreting and applying the
ECHR, 54 the EU preliminary reference procedure was conceived and used by the CJEU in
order to foster the unity and uniformity of EU law across the Member States.55 These
See Janneke Gerards, Advisory opinions, preliminary rulings and the new Protocol No. 16 to the European
Convention on Human Rights, 4 MAASTRICHTJOURNALOF EUROPEAN AND COMPARATIVE LAw 630-651(2014).
54The relationship between national courts and the ECtHR is not a new topic (see Laurence R. Helfer, Redesigning
the European Court of Human Rights. Embeddedness as a deep structural principle of the European human rights
regime, 19 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 125-29 (2008); A EUROPE OF RIGHTS (Helen Keller & Alec Stone
Sweet eds., 2008) 687-688, supra at note 22, although it will be reshaped and will become more formalized as a
result of Protocol No. 16.
Compare ANTHONY ARNULL, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS COURT OF JUSTICE 97 (2006). On the different scope and
reach of the EU and the ECHR and on the different role played by the two supranational courts, see MARTINICO &
POLLICINO, supra note 23.
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different objectives reflect the differing natures of the two organizations: whilst the CoE is
a human rights organization, which is in principle unwilling to set out a harmonized human
rights policy for its forty-seven Contracting Parties, the EU is primarily a regional
integration process, with the CJEU acting as the first engine of the harmonization of
national legal systems. Indeed, the CJEU was considered to be first and foremost a
guarantor of EU competences, starting with the internal market, and a guarantor also of
the separation of powers within the EU, rather than a human rights protector.57
In practice, however, given the principle of primacy (which has superseded even national
constitutional norms) and the increasing case law on fundamental rights, both pre- and
post-Charter, the two supranational courts are potentially able to encroach upon one of
the most important functions that European Constitutional Courts have, that is, the
protection of fundamental rights entrenched in national Constitutions.
Moreover, both the advisory opinion mechanism and the preliminary reference
mechanism are unidirectional. Only national courts and, in the case of Protocol no. 16, only
the highest courts identified by each Contracting Party, can refer questions to the two
supranational courts, and not the other way around. This is notwithstanding that the
potential for intrusion into national constitutional systems by the supranational courts
could have made the introduction of a two-way communication flow between the
ECtHR/CJEU and Constitutional Courts desirable as a step before the supranational court
takes a decision which is sensitive for the domestic Constitution. In this light, the question
arises of whether, based on the actual functioning of the preliminary reference procedure
before the CJEU, it is possible to predict that Constitutional Courts might appear reluctant
in exploiting the new device introduced by Protocol No. 16.sa
The different conceptions which underlie the two organizations and, hence, the two
judicial procedures, are reflected in the fact that while all Member States' courts are
involved in the enforcement of Article 267 TFEU (with the well-known differences between
courts of first instance and appeal and courts of last resort), the mechanism of the advisory
opinions can be subject to a selective application, since adherence to Protocol no. 16 is
voluntary on the part of the CoE's members (Section B). Thus, the standardization of the
56 This is confirmed by the long-standing margin of appreciation doctrine, now entrenched in Protocol no. 15. See
Federico Fabbrini, The Margin of Appreciation and the Principle of Subsidiarity: A Comparison, 15 ICOURTs WORKING
PAPER SERIEs 2015, forthcoming in A FUTURE FOR THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION? (Mads Andenas, Eirik Bjorge &
Giuseppe Bianco eds., 2015).
Although a recent study has proven that at the very beginning of the process of European integration there was
an (unsuccessful) attempt to make the European Community a truly human rights actor, particularly in order to
preserve fundamental rights in the Member States. See Grainne de B~rca, The Road Not Taken: The European
Union as a Global Human Right Actor, 4 AM. J. INT'L L. 653-64 (2011).
See, for more details, Section C.V.
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relationship between every single national highest court and the ECtHR, for the sake of the
uniform application of the ECHR, is not at stake in the case of the advisory opinion
procedure.
In turn, according to the discretion granted to each Contracting Party, the new mechanism
of Protocol No. 16 is likely to involve Constitutional Courts in a very asymmetrical way,
depending on whether national governments have opted in or not. Given the limited
number of signatures to the Protocol collected since the date of opening almost two years
ago, and that only five countries, at present, have completed the ratification process
(Section B), it may well be that only 10 Constitutional Courts-ten being the minimum
requirement for the Protocol to enter into force-will "take advantage" of the advisory
opinion procedure. Thus, for most Constitutional Courts, the legal situation might not
change. Furthermore, even if Protocol no. 16 is ratified by all Contracting Parties of the
ECHR, Constitutional Courts would still enjoy full discretion in deciding whether to request
advisory opinions from the ECtHR. Indeed, the implementation of the mechanism is
completely reliant on the unilateral commitment of Constitutional Courts (and other
indicated highest courts) to engage in a dialogue with the ECtHR. This unilateral
commitment cannot be taken for granted at the moment of the signature in the light of
the foreseen effects of this new device (see also Section E) and, at the same time, of the
willingness of the ECtHR to respond to these request.
By contrast, in the EU, when the conditions of Article 267 TFEU are fulfilled, the
Constitutional Courts of all Member States are obliged to issue a preliminary reference to
the CJEU, although many of them have traditionally avoided doing so.s9 Constitutional
Courts under Protocol no. 16 would not have such an obligation.
//. Judges Entitled to Ask for an Advisory Opinion and to Refer: Are the Constitutional Courts
Like Any Other Courts?
Neither the preliminary reference procedure nor the advisory opinion mechanism set out a
special role for constitutional judges.6o They stand as any other judge entitled to use that
device and do not enjoy a sui generis treatment despite their access and jurisdiction, their
procedure of appointment and composition, and the constitutional nature of the
"material" they constantly manage-material which involves potential conflicts between
" On the reluctance of Constitutional Courts and its gradual overcoming, especially in the last few years, see
Monica Claes, Luxembourg, here we come? Constitutional Courts and the preliminary reference procedure, in this
Special Issue. On the still hesitant attitude of some constitutional judges, in particular in Eastern Europe, see the
articles of this Special Issue highlighting a missing link between Constitutional Courts and the CJEU.
60 See also Section B.IV supra on this point. In the EU, the lack of engagement of the CJEU with Constitutional
Courts as the referring courts has been often criticized by scholars and has been put forward as justification, in
turn, of most Constitutional Courts' timid attitude toward the preliminary reference proceeding. See, e.g.,
Leonard F. M. Besselink, The parameters of constitutional conflict after Melloni, 39 EUR. L. REV. 531-52 (2014).
2015 1403
German Law Journal
the level of protection of fundamental rights under constitutional law and that ensured
under the two supranational regimes. While Constitutional Courts, in the countries in
which they operate, are usually considered, because of their powers, to be "special
courts", their specialty is devalued or simply overlooked by the EU treaties and the ECHR
(and its protocols).
However, while Article 267 TFEU treats all national judges equally in terms of access to the
preliminary reference procedure before the CJEU, with the only difference lying in the
obligation to refer for the courts of last resort (Constitutional Courts included), Protocol
no. 16 draws a clear line between highest courts and tribunals and other courts. Only the
former are entitled to request advisory opinions from the ECtHR, provided that a case is
pending before them and that the relevant legal and factual background of the case is set
forth; the remaining courts are not. Nonetheless, as stated supra (Section B.IV), what a
highest court or tribunal actually is rests wholly upon the discretion of each Contracting
Party.
What is important to highlight here is the lack of any particular acknowledgment in
Protocol no. 16 of the role of Constitutional Courts and judicial bodies that carry out the
constitutional review of legislation as being one of the ultimate guarantors of
62
constitutional rights at the domestic level in most Contracting Parties. It is the
importance and the potential clash between performing the constitutional review of
legislation and applying the ECHR that is neglected in Protocol no. 16. By speaking of
highest tribunals, Protocol no. 16 only takes into account the function of judges of last
resort in criminal, civil, and administrative matters, regardless of whether they can also
review the constitutionality of the norm applicable to the case. The prospect of conflict
between the effects of the review of constitutionality and conventionality is denied by the
Protocol. For it to have been otherwise, the Protocol would have needed to have referred
specifically to these kinds of review instead of identifying the relevant courts through their
ranking in the judicial order.
The problem does not arise where there is a diffuse system of constitutional review of
legislation in place, because the ultimate judicial authority, for instance a Supreme Court,
is the court of last resort for both the review of constitutionality and conventionality at the
same time. Neither does it arise where a Constitutional Court, like in Germany, or, albeit
with some caveats, in Italy, reviews the compliance of legislation with both the Basic Law
and the ECHR. However, more complex and peculiar are the situations in which the control
61 Art. 10, Protocol No. 16. On this point, see Paul Gragl, (Judicial) love is not a one-way street: the EU preliminary
reference procedure as a model for ECtHR advisory opinions under draft Protocol no. 16, 2 EUR. L. REv. 229-47
(2013).
62 Possibly with the only exceptions of countries like the UK and the Netherlands where no constitutional review
of legislation is in place.
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of conventionality is disjointed from that of constitutionality, as in France. In these
circumstances, which courts should stand as the "highest courts" under Protocol no. 16:
those having ultimate jurisdiction only for the conventionality review, thus excluding the
Constitutional Court, or also those performing the constitutionality review (although they
are not involved in checking the compliance of national law with the ECHR)? In other
words, by reference to which function are the "highest courts" to be identified?
Even in the case of centralization of the review of constitutionality and conventionality in
the hands of the same Constitutional Court, some problems could arise if other courts are
considered by the Contracting Parties to be "highest tribunals" for the purpose of Protocol
no. 16. Indeed, it is clear that the most sensitive context is the one in which the outcome
of the control of conventionality and constitutionality may diverge. In this regard, Protocol
no. 16 can create problems for intra-judicial relationships at a state level, especially
between Supreme Courts and Constitutional Courts if both are considered "highest
tribunals". A Supreme Court might strategically use the advisory opinion procedure in
order to seek guidance in the interpretation of the ECHR by the ECtHR and to narrow
through this 'external' interpretation the discretion of the Constitutional Court in
protecting a fundamental right.
A comparable case has already arisen in the context of the EU with the French Court of
Cassation deciding to make a preliminary reference to the CJEU before involving the
Conseil constitutionnel through the control prioritaire de constitutionnalit6." Under those
circumstances, the CJEU confirmed that the preliminary reference takes precedence over
the domestic reference, with a view to ensuring the uniform implementation of EU law as
64the supreme value. This could be explained by the mandate of the CJEU as the
supranational court that fosters the ultimate objective of "an ever closer union" (Article 1
TEU). By contrast, in the case of the advisory opinion procedure in the framework of
Protocol No. 16, and given the rationale of the procedure, which does not aim at ensuring
the uniform implementation of the ECHR as long as fundamental rights are protected, it
should be for any Contracting Party to determine whether precedence should be given to
constitutional review of legislation and thus to a preliminary reference of constitutionality
by the Constitutional Court or, rather, to requesting an advisory opinion on the
interpretation of the ECHR.
See, e.g., Joined Cases C-188 & C-189/10, Melki and Adbeli, 2010 E.C.R. 1-05667 and the comment by Arthur
Dyevre, The Melki Way: The Melki Case and Everything you Always Wanted to Know about French Judicial Politics
(But Were Afraid to Ask), in CONSTITUTIONAL CONVERSATIONS IN EUROPE: ACTORS, TOPICS AND PROCEDURES 309-22 (M.
Claes et al. eds., 2012).
64See Frangois-Xavier Mil let & Nicoletta Perlo, The first preliminary reference of the French Constitutional Court to
the CIEU: revolution de palais or revolution in French constitutional law?, in this Special Issue.
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As a result, the position of constitutional judges in general can be challenged by the use of
the advisory opinion procedure, like the preliminary reference procedure. Furthermore,
the actual measures of implementation of Protocol No. 16 at the domestic level,
depending on what are the "highest tribunals" identified, can transform a cooperative tool
between the ECtHR and Constitutional Courts into a prospective limitation for the role of
the latter courts.
///. The Prospective Impact of the ECtHR's Docket Control on Advisory Opinions
Protocol No. 16 can be better understood within the framework of a wider process of
reform of the ECHR system, which finds its justification in the need to counterbalance the
increasing workload of the ECtHR and the delay of its judgments.eS By allowing the highest
courts and tribunals to seek guidance on the correct interpretation or application of the
ECHR in advance, it is thought that Protocol no. 16 could reduce the number of
66
applications brought before the ECtHR. However, this objective could not be reached if
the number of requests for advisory opinions overwhelmed the activity of the Court, which
67has to deal with almost 65,000 pending cases as of 31 March 2015.
Hence the idea of, firstly, limiting the requests for advisory opinions to the highest
jurisdictions and, secondly, granting the ECtHR the possibility of not, with due reasons,
delivering the requested opinion. The very high number of preliminary reference
proceedings before the CJEU, indeed, derives mainly from the activism of the courts of first
instance and appeal that allow the CJEU to have a say on many crucial issues for the
deepening of the European integration process (direct effect, primacy, state liability, and
so on).6 By contrast, as stated, supreme and, even more so, Constitutional, Courts, have
See VIadimiro Zagrebelsky, Parere consultivo della Corte europea dei diritti umani: vera efalso sussidiarieta, in
LA RICHIESTA DI PARERI CONSULTIVI ALLA CORTE DI STRASBURGO DA PARTE DELLE PI. ALTE GIURISDIZIONI NAZIONALL PRIME
RIFLESSIONI IN VISTA DELLA RATIFICA DEL PROTOCOLLO 16 ALLA CONVENZIONE EUROPEA DEI DIRITTI DELL'UOMO 91 (Elisabetta
Lamarque ed., 2015).
The issue of whether such an objective can actually be achieved cannot be discussed here, but it suffices to say
that most applications reaching the courts are due to systematic violations of the Convention and come from 4
contracting parties: Ukraine, Russia, Turkey, and Italy. The advisory opinions under Protocol no. 16 do not appear
to redress such systematic violations, which are patent and well known by the competent domestic authorities,
and, thus, to eliminate the cause of the high number of applications from those States. Moreover, nothing
prevents an individual from lodging an application before the ECtHR (Art. 34 ECHR), even if the matter has been
already addressed by the Court under the advisory opinion procedure. See Explanatory Report to Protocol no. 16,
Art. 5; Gerards, supra note 53, at 636.
67 See the statistics available on the website of the Court at
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Statspendingmonth_2015_BIL.pdf.
See Harm Schepel & Erhard Blankenburg, Mobilizing the European Court of Justice, in THE EUROPEAN COURT OF
JUSTICE 37 (Grainne de Brca & Joseph H.H. Weiler eds., 2001); Thomas de la Mare & Catherine Donnelly,
Preliminary rulings and EU legal integration: evolution and stasis, in THE EVOLUTION OF EU LAW 363 (Paul Craig &
Grainne de Brca eds., 2011).
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traditionally been more reluctant. By excluding lower courts, Protocol no. 16 avoids the
"explosion" of requests for advisory opinions sent to the ECtHR, but, at the same time,
limits the timing of the ECtHR's intervention to the very end of the domestic judicial
proceeding. Earlier ECtHR involvement would possibly have been more effective in terms
of restoring violated rights.
Moreover, unlike in the EU preliminary reference procedure, under Protocol No. 16 the
ECtHR retains the power to decide which requests it wants to address; it is not a matter of
admissibility of the reference on procedural and factual grounds. 70 Rather, the ECtHR
enjoys a discretion as to which opinions to issue.
The request lodged by a highest court is analyzed by a panel of five ECtHR judges, including
ex officio the judge of the High Contracting Party from where the mechanism was activated
and, if the request is accepted, then it is the Grand Chamber that delivers the opinion. If
the request is denied, reasons must be given for the refusal by the panel and must,
moreover, be made public.
Given the vague phrasing of Article 2 of Protocol No. 16, it is likely that the ECtHR will
develop its own criteria to select cases. It has also been convincingly argued that because
of the composition of the panels selecting the advisory opinions and deciding on referrals
to the Grand Chamber, the same conditions will apply to both cases. This would mean that
the request of a highest court would be accepted "if the case raises a serious question
affecting the interpretation or application of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, or a
serious issue of general importance" (Article 43(2) ECHR). Thus, selection would be
oriented by the quality and significance of the issues to be addressed.
There are elements which lead one to foresee a mild scrutiny on those conditions, whereas
others lead to the consideration that the ECtHR will set strict standards. On the one hand,
if the primary objective of the advisory opinion mechanism is to strengthen the
relationships between national courts and the ECtHR and to favor the correct
interpretation and application of the ECHR, it would be reasonable to assume that the
ECtHR would try to be as responsive as possible to the concerns of the highest courts,
selecting the greatest number of opinions compatible with the sustainability of its
workload. The new mechanism of Protocol No. 16, indeed, is designed to centralize
69 Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou, Interaction between the European Court of Human Rights and member states:
European consensus, advisory opinions and the question of legitimacy, in THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND
ITS DISCONTENTS. TURNING CRITICISM INTO STRENGTH 116-46 (Spyridon Flogaitis etal. eds., 2013).
70 See the acte clair doctrine of the CJEU and the CILFITcase, Case C-283/81, Sr CILFIT e Lanificio di Gavardo SpA
v. Ministero della sanita, 1982 E.C.R. 03415.
71 See Gerards, supra note 53, at 644-45.
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interpretation of the ECHR, with a central authority, the ECtHR, giving guidance to the
"fellow courts". 72
This trend towards the centralization of interpretation is testified by the preliminary
reference procedure and the CJEU, although devoid of a docket control. The CJEU has
traditionally been very generous in declaring preliminary references admissible, starting
from the definition of "any court or tribunal of a Member State" allowed to issue a
preliminary reference (Article 267 TFEU). The limits posed to preliminary references
through the CJEU case law, like the CILFIT case and the acte clair doctrine, are aimed only
at balancing the need for a constant dialogue between national and supranational courts
with a workload that could hinder the CJEU.
On the other hand, however, the ECtHR fulfills a different role to the CJEU, and indeed,
when the discussion on Protocol no. 16 was still underway, the ECtHR judges expressed
serious concerns about the idea of delivering advisory opinions also.73 The ECtHR usually
judges in concreto, on specific cases, and when deciding on a case it does not see
interpretation as separate from application of the ECHR. 74 This makes the mechanism of
Protocol No. 16 rather different from the EU preliminary ruling procedure. 75 It is thus
unlikely that the ECtHR will decide to issue an opinion on a law in abstracto; at the same
time, it will not deliver an advisory opinion on issues which are already at stake in a
pending case (Article 47(2) ECHR), unless the case is completely new and the Court has
never been asked to decide on the point in question before.
IV. The Effects of the ECtHR Opinions and the CJEU Preliminary Judgments: A Similar
"Threat" to the Autonomy of Constitutional Interpretation?
In theory, the most apparent difference between the preliminary reference procedure and
the advisory opinion mechanism consists in the effects of the intervention of the
76
supranational court. By case law and conventional interpretation of the EU treaties,
72 Whether this centralization will succeed is difficult to predict, but some hypotheses are advanced in Section I.E.
See Zagrebelsky, supra note 65, at 93.
74 As noted by Vladimiro Zagrebelsky, Protocol No. 16, Art. 1, unexpectedly talks about "interpretation or
application" rather than interpretation and application.
See Christos Giannopoulos, Considerations on Protocol N'16: Can the New Advisory Competence of the
European Court of Human Rights Breathe New Life into the European Convention on Human Rights?, 2 GERMAN L. J.
337, 345 (2015).
7 See Roberto Conti, La richiesta di parere consultivo al/a Corte europea do parte delle Alte Corti introdotto dal
Prot. 16 CEDU e il rinvio pregiudiziale alla Corte di Giustizia dell'Unione europea. Prove d'orchestra per una
nomofilachia europea, in LA RICHIESTA DI PARERI CONSULTIVI ALLA CORTE DI STRASBURGO DA PARTE DELLE PI. ALTE GIURISDIZIONI
NAZIONALI, supra note 63, at 100-02; Giannopoulos, supra note 73, at 341-43.
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which are silent on this point, these effects are binding and ergo omnes for the CJEU case
law,n whilst, according to Article 5 of Protocol No. 16, the advisory opinions are explicitly
non-binding. It would follow that the national judicial authority issuing the request for an
advisory opinion then has discretionary powers regarding the implementation of the ECtHR
opinion, meaning that it could perhaps even be disregarded (Section B.Ill.1).
This notwithstanding, the Explanatory Report to the new Protocol states:
They [the advisory opinions] would, however, form part
of the case law of the Court, alongside its judgments
and decisions. The interpretation of the Convention
and the Protocols thereto contained in such advisory
opinions would be analogous in its effect to the
interpretative elements set out by the Court in
78judgments and decisions.
Although the binding and inter-partes effects of final ECtHR judgments cannot be
recognized in the new advisory opinions (Article 46(1) ECHR), the Explanatory Report
emphasizes the importance of these opinions as part of the case law of the Court and,
therefore, as being of comparable interpretative value to its judgments and decisions.
Having force of res interpretata, the advisory opinions complement the ECHR and are thus
expected to be complied with by national courts, parliaments, and administrations (and
not only by the issuing authority).7 The practical implications of these opinions, based on
the Explanatory Report, could therefore be much more significant than the plain words of
Article 5 let predict.
Whilst the reference in an advisory opinion to the interpretation of an ECHR right would,
therefore, be binding, the concrete application and adaptation of that interpretation to the
pending case would be for the national court to do. Thus, an advisory opinion would
contain both a binding part and a part specifically addressed to the case at stake, and this
latter would be merely a guide for the national judge. However, because of the link,
highlighted in Article 1 of Protocol No. 16, between the advisory opinion and the pending
"See Jan Komarek, Federal elements in the Community judicial system: building coherence in the Community legal
order, 42 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 9, 10 (2005).
78 See Explanatory Report at point 27.
See Adam Bodnar, Res interpretata: legal effect of the European Court of Human Rights judgments for other
states than those which were party to the proceedings, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE 21S CENTURY, 223-
62 (Yves Haeck & Eva Brems eds., 2014); Janneke Gerards, The European Courtof Human Rights and the national
courts-giving shape to the notion of "shared responsibility", in IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ECHR AND OF THE JUDGMENTS




case, a clear-cut distinction between the general interpretation of an ECHR provision and
its application to the case in the light of the criteria and standards set out by the ECtHR is
very difficult to trace in practice. This, coupled with the authority of the opinion and the
seriousness of the questions raised (see supra Section II.C), would make it almost
impossible for the highest court requesting the advisory opinion not to follow it in
resolving the case. Furthermore, given the general interpretative standards and principles
established through them, advisory opinions could be deemed to have an impact
comparable to an ECtHR pilot judgment, with ergo omnes effects, rather than to an
"ordinary" ECtHR judgment, with just inter-partes implications.
In practice, then, the difference between the preliminary reference procedure and the
advisory opinion mechanism in terms of actual effects on domestic courts and national
legal systems may dissolve.ao Depending on the level of detail of the advisory opinions and
on the potential use of the mechanism as a vehicle to anticipate subsequent case law
development, advisory opinions, even if addressed to other highest courts, may be
perceived by national Constitutional Courts as being a possible threat to their autonomy in
constitutional interpretation. The same applied for many years-and still applies, today-
with regards to preliminary rulings by the CJEU. Some commentators have considered,
however, that advisory opinions might be rather vague in their content, because the ECtHR
usually refrains from setting general principles, so as to reserve for itself a certain margin
of manoeuvre for addressing subsequent cases. By the same token, the Court might not
be willing to use the possibility, expressly provided for by Protocol No. 16, to deliver
separate opinions where no unanimous consent is reached, as has happened in the two
cases of advisory opinions delivered to the Committee of Ministers. Should this be
confirmed, the preference for delivering a single opinion would be likely to lead to a
compromise solution among ECtHR judges, open to different interpretations.82
V. Would Constitutional Courts be Willing to Engage in the Advisory Opinion Procedure?
Drawing on the Experience of the Preliminary Reference Procedure in the EU
What will make the advisory opinion procedure work is first of all a cooperative attitude by
the parties involved: the ECtHR and national highest courts, and in particular the
Constitutional Courts as the traditional watchdogs of fundamental rights in domestic
constitutional systems in Europe. The centralizing trend in the interpretation of the ECHR
80 It has also been argued, on the EU side, that the level of follow-up on the CJEU preliminary rulings by national
courts has been rather modest: see, for example, Michal Bobek, Of feasibility and silent elephants: the legitimacy
of the Court of Justice through the eyes of national courts, in JUDGING EUROPE'S JUDGES: THE LEGITIMACY OF THE CASE LAW
OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE EXAMINED 917-33 (Maurice Adams et al. eds., 2013).
81 Zagrebelsky, supra note 65, at 96.
82 Id. at 95.
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and its protocols that may be detected as a consequence of the entry into force of Protocol
no. 16 can only become a reality if and insofar as national courts activate the mechanism.
However, as has been widely acknowledged, the experience of the preliminary references
before the CJEU testifies that Constitutional Courts in particular have not usually been
willing to engage in such a "conversation." This is despite the fact that, acting as courts of
last resort, Constitutional Courts are obliged to refer questions of validity and
interpretation of EU law that arise before them in order to solve a pending case. If these
Courts have been reluctant in the presence of a precise obligation stemming from Article
267 TFEU, the hesitancy may be even stronger where, as in the case of the advisory
opinion mechanism, such a duty does not exist.
Yet a direct "confrontation" between the ECtHR and Constitutional Courts is unavoidable
as long as the object and the standard of review of conventionality and constitutionality at
least partially overlap, or as long as they have to cope with the same challenges. This is
reflected also in the shifting attitude of many Constitutional Courts towards the
preliminary reference procedure in the EU in the aftermath of the Lisbon Treaty and the
Euro-crisis. The codification of rights at EU level and eventually the entry into force of the
Charter of Fundamental Rights has triggered a reaction by some reluctant Constitutional
Courts (in Italy, France, and Spain, for example) that could no longer escape direct
interaction with the CJEU, once that Court had officially become a competing authority for
the determination of the level of protection of rights ensured at the domestic level
(through the application of EU law). By the same token, a similar reaction by Constitutional
Courts (in Germany and Slovenia, for instance) was triggered within national constitutional
systems facing the stress of the financial crisis and the Euro-crisis law.
Likewise, in the implementation of the new advisory opinion procedure, Constitutional
Courts can potentially be interested in establishing a long-standing "partnership" with the
ECtHR, with the aim of ensuring the stability and predictability of the system of
fundamental rights protection in Europe. The process of building up a relationship
between Constitutional Courts and the ECtHR is the opposite of the one developed
between Constitutional Courts and CJEU, although the final outcome, following Protocol
No. 16, could be similar.
Within the framework of the ECHR, the national and supranational courts have always
focused on the same issues in terms of the protection of rights, but they did not encroach
upon each other's competence until individual applications to the ECtHR were made
possible in 1998. After Protocol No. 11 to the ECHR eventually entered into force, only a
hidden dialogue between Constitutional Courts and the ECtHR was possible, as no device
for their direct interaction was in force. Protocol No. 16 and the advisory opinions would
fill this gap. By contrast, in the EU, the mechanism by which Constitutional Courts and the
CJEU can interact directly-the preliminary reference procedure-has been in force since
the very beginning of the process of European integration. However, until the 1970s, when
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the CJEU became increasingly involved in the protection of fundamental rights, the
supranational court and Constitutional Courts spoke different languages. This remains
partly the case even today: the CJEU has usually spoken the language of the internal
market, whereas Constitutional Courts have always been concerned with constitutional
rights beyond economic freedoms.
Even without using the preliminary reference procedure, the CJEU and Constitutional
Courts have been indirectly engaged in an intense conversation through their case law,
which has shaped the whole process of European integration. What held most
Constitutional Courts back from exploiting the preliminary reference tool until recently,
despite the legal obligation arising from the treaties and the ergo omnes effects, was the
constraint provoked upon them by a direct and targeted preliminary ruling of the CJEU
adopted upon their request.
For the same reason, Constitutional Courts could also feel uncomfortable with the advisory
opinion mechanism, which, as has been argued, if activated would be more binding in
terms of ECHR interpretation than one could expect, based on Article 5 of Protocol No. 16.
Since, by contrast with the prescription of Article 267 TFEU, the request of advisory
opinions is optional, in order to preserve its autonomy a Constitutional Court might be
reluctant about submitting its case law on fundamental rights to the standards set by the
ECtHR for the pending case. Constitutional Courts might strategically avoid requesting
advisory opinions if they perceive those opinions as being not merely guidance, but as
limiting their discretion to find the most suitable solution for the domestic jurisdiction.
VI. National Constitutional Courts and the EU Accession to the ECHR: "Lost in the
Application" of Protocol No. 16 and the EU Preliminary Reference Procedure
To the complex picture of the relationship between the ECtHR and Constitutional Courts
already laid out must be added a further element. How can the European system of
fundamental rights litigation and the place of Constitutional Courts accommodate the new
mechanism of the advisory opinions within the preliminary reference procedure?
This question is not merely hypothetical; it has been expressly invoked by the CJEU as a
prospective issue of incompatibility between the draft accession agreement of the EU to
the ECHR and EU law. When Protocol No. 16 was signed, on 2 October 2013, the draft
agreement had already been finalized. Yet the CJEU detected a potential threat arising
from the advisory opinion procedure for the autonomy of EU law, in particular for what
8 See Opinion 2/13, paras. 197-199 (Dec. 18, 2014), http://curia.europa.eu/.
84 See, e.g., Daniel Halberstam, It's the Autonomy, Stupid!"A Modest Defense of Opinion 2/13 on EU Accession to
the ECHR, and the Way Forward, 16 GERMAN L. J. 10546 (2015); Johan Callewaert, Protocol 16 and the Autonomy
of EU Law: Who Is Threatening Whom?, EUROPEAN LAW BLOG, 3 October 2014, available at
http://europeanlawblog.eu/?p=2551.
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has been described as "the keystone of the judicial system established by the Treaties" (§
176 Opinion): the preliminary reference procedure.as It is especially the lack of
coordination between these two mechanisms when Constitutions, the Charter, and the
ECHR overlap on the protection of a certain right that creates concerns in the Opinion of
the CJEU. The CJEU focused its reasoning here only on the CJEU and the ECtHR, as if
Constitutional Courts or national judges carrying out constitutional review of legislation
were not at stake in this "dangerous twist" for the protection of fundamental rights in
Europe.
The CJEU argued that the main mechanism which has protected the autonomy of EU law-
the preliminary reference procedure-would be jeopardized if the same judges (i.e., the
national highest courts and tribunals, which under EU law are obliged to issue a
preliminary reference whenever a question of interpretation or validity is raised) firstly
involved the ECtHR through a request for an advisory opinion. This would occur, in
particular, when a highest domestic court had doubts about the compliance of EU norms
or national measures implementing EU law with the ECHR. The risk, in the Opinion of the
CJEU, is the circumvention of the Article 267 TFEU procedure.
According to the CJEU, when the protection of a right equally concerns the EU Charter and
the ECHR, national courts of last instance might find it more convenient to resort to the
advisory opinion procedure in combination with the activation by the ECtHR of a
mechanism that is devised by the draft accession agreement-the "prior involvement" of
the CJEU itself by the ECtHR. This could happen when an indirect action against EU law for
the violation of an ECHR right is brought before a national court of last resort, which might
then decide not to issue a preliminary reference to the CJEU, but rather a request for an
advisory opinion from the ECtHR. EU law would then be interpreted without the CJEU. The
prior involvement mechanism allows the ECtHR only to consult the CJEU before a decision
affecting EU law (and its autonomy) is taken.
In Opinion 2/13, the CJEU considered the combination of a request for an advisory opinion
and the prior involvement mechanism to have the potential to structurally undermine the
use of the (direct) preliminary reference procedure. In this case, the usual "blindness" of
the supranational courts towards the peculiar and essential role of Constitutional Courts in
816Europe was also confirmed. Indeed, on the one hand, the problem about the order of
precedence among different types of referrals replicates the complex dynamic already in
place between preliminary references of constitutionality to Constitutional Courts and
preliminary references under EU law. On the other hand, in Opinion 2/13 the CJEU
Adam Lazowski & Ramses A. Wessel, When Caveats Turn into Locks: Opinion 2/13 on Accession of the European
Union to the ECHR, 16 GERMAN L. J. 179, 188 (2015).
With reference to Constitutional Courts in the EU, see Jan Komarek, National constitutional courts in the
European constitutional democracy, 3 INT'L J. CONST. L. 525-44 (2014).
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oversimplified the reality by raising the issue of the bilateral relationship between the
ECtHR and itself when a right is protected to a different extent by the Charter and the
ECHR. However, Constitutions are also competing sources of authority for the protection of
fundamental rights and so are their Courts, which are inserted into a network of
relationships starting from those with the respective domestic supreme courts. In a system
of fundamental rights protection resulting from the process of EU accession to the ECHR
and from Protocol No. 16, and designed through these intertwined-although not fully
coordinated-national and supranational courts, the main aim for which this complex
architecture is in place is often overlooked. In other words, in an attempt to codify the
procedures and to claim the precedence of a preliminary referral (constitutional,
European, or conventional) over the others, according to "top down" mechanisms, it is
possible to lose sight of the protection of fundamental rights, with too many
"Constitutional Courts,"87 domestic, European, and conventional, pretending to be judge in
their own cause and to have the last word.""
The standpoint of national Constitutional Courts in the application of these mechanisms
cannot be neglected, as they represent the main point of mediation between the
enforcement of EU law and the ECtHR with domestic Constitutions, especially when a
direct conflict arises between the level of protection accorded to a fundamental right
under national constitutional law vis-a-vis the ECHR and/or the EU Charter. Given their
proximity to citizens, national Constitutional Courts are best placed to accommodate
supranational norms and case law within their domestic jurisdictions, while preserving, at
the same time, a suitable degree of national constitutional ownership.
D. How to Fix the Problems Deriving From the Advisory Opinions in the ECHR System?
Lessons from the Advisory Opinions Within the ICHR System
1. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights as a Model
After two years, Protocol No. 16 has not yet entered into force. There has been much
commentary and discussion in the legal scholarship on the functioning of the advisory
opinion system within the ECHR, underlining the strengths but also the weaknesses, as
clearly shown in the analysis provided in Sections B and C. In particular, one of the most
criticized aspects is that apparently Protocol No. 16 would not be able to reach the goals
for which it was designed, due to, on one side, the uncertainty surrounding the
87 On the ECtHR and the CJEU as "Constitutional Courts" in their respective domains, see Steven Greer & Luzius
Wildhaber, Revisiting the Debate about "Constitutionalising" the European Court of Human Rights, 12 HUMAN
RIGHTs L. REV. 655, 668-70 (2012), BARBARA RANDAZZo, GIUSTIZIA COSTITUZIONALE SOVRANAZIONALE. LA CORTE EUROPEA DEI
DIRITTI DELL'UOMO 4-10 (2012); Bo Vesterdorf, A constitutional court for the EU?, 4 INT'L J. CONST. L. 607-17 (2006).
Aida Torres Perez, Too many voices? The prior involvement of the Court of Justice of the European Union, 4 EUR.
J. HUMAN RIGHTs 565, 583 (2013).
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harmonization of the advisory function with the contentious function (as demonstrated by
the experience of the ICHR), and, on the other side, the real utility of the Protocol as an
instrument capable of strengthening the judicial dialogue in Europe (see Section B).
These critical aspects have also all appeared in the Inter-American system. The Inter-
American Court of Human Rights (hereafter, the ICHR) has dealt with these issues in a very
developed and advanced body of jurisprudence, and it is useful to look at this in order to
speculate on the possible evolutions of the advisory mechanism in the European context.
With this question of anticipating how the advisory mechanism might function being the
main purpose, we will firstly analyze the main structural characteristics of the advisory
opinion within the ICHR (the relevant norms and the case law developed by the Court in
the light of the elements of the ICHR system) (1), before focusing, secondly, on the
relationship between its consultative function and its adjudicatory function (1l), and, finally,
on the dialogue between the ICHR and States (ll).
IL The Structural Features of the Advisory Opinions in the ICHR
In 1985, the Vice-President of the ICHR, Thomas Buergenthal, wrote, "[t]he role of the
Court as a judicial institution of the OAS is grounded in its advisory jurisdiction."90 Being an
"autonomous judicial institution whose purpose is the application and interpretation of the
American Convention on Human Rights" (as established in Article 1 of its Statute), the ICHR
exercises its jurisdictional function through two modalities: the adjudicatory function and
the advisory function.
The ICHR advisory function, defined as "multilateral rather than litigious",91 has been
enriched by the Court itself, taking as a starting point Article 64 of the American
.92Convention.
See Pasquale De Sena, Caratteri e prospettive del Protocollo 16 nel prisma dell'esperienza del sistema
interamericano di protezione dei diritti dell'uomo, 8 DIRITTI UMANI E DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 593-606 (2014).
9o See Thomas Buergenthal, The Advisory Practice of the Inter-American Human Rights Court, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 1
(1985).
9 See I/A Court H.R., Reports of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (Art. 51 American Convention on
Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-15/97 of 14 November 1997. Series A, No.15, para. 26, according to which it
is evident that the State or organ requesting an advisory opinion is not the only one with a legitimate interest in
the outcome of the procedure, whose very purpose is the protection of human rights.
92 The advisory function, besides complementing the ICHR adjudicatory competence, also complements the
competences of the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, as indicated in the Charter of the Organization




According to this provision, all Member States of the Organization of American States
(hereafter, the OAS), whether or not they have ratified the Convention, may consult the
Court. All the organs of the Organization (organs listed in Chapter X of the OAS Charter)
may also consult the Court, but their competence is limited because they can only consult
the Court within their sphere of competence.93 Even if the Inter-American Commission is
one of the organs listed in Chapter X of the OAS Charter, the Court has recognized its
absolute right to consult the Court, given the Commission's broad powers relating to the
promotion and observance of human rights as established in Article 112 of the OAS
Charter. 94 However, this absolute right does not extend the Commission competence to
address a request to the Court according to Article 64(2) (see below).9 s
Organs indicated in Article 64 may also participate in the proceeding, despite the fact that
neither the Statute of the ICH R nor the 1980 Rule of the Court provide for amicus curice.
This is because since its very first advisory opinion the Court allowed national and
The expression "within their sphere of competence" has been interpreted by the Court with a "legitimate
institutional interest" by the requesting organ in the questions posed in the request. See I/A Court H.R., The
Effect of Reservations on the Entry into Force of the American Convention on Human Rights (Arts. 74 and 75),
Advisory Opinion OC-2/82 of September 24, 1982. Series A, No. 2, para. 14, according to which, even if initially
each organ decides whether the request falls within its sphere of competence, the Court has the ultimate word in
determining compliance with this requisite by reference to the OAS Charter and the constitutive instrument and
legal practice of the particular organ. See also BERTHA SANTOsCOY-NORO, LE SYSTEME INTERAMERICAIN DE PROTECTION DES
DROITS DE ['HOMME, EN INSTITUT INTERNATIONAL DES DROITS DE ['HOMME (1996).
94 See The Effect of Reservations on the Entry into Force, supra note 91, at para 16. See also I/A Court H.R.,
Restrictions to the Death Penalty (Arts. 4(2) and 4(4) American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion
OC-3/83 of September 8, 1983. Series A, No. 3 OC 3/1983, para. 42.
9 See I/A Court H.R., International Responsibility for the Promulgation and Enforcement of Laws in Violation of the
Convention (Arts. 1 and 2 of the American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-14/94 of
December 9, 1994. Series A, no.14, paras. 24-26, in which the Court excluded the possibility for the Commission
to request an advisory opinion on a proposed amendment to the Constitution of Peru, which would have
expanded the number of cases for which the death penalty could have applied, because the Commission was not
requesting a statement as to the compatibility of that provision of Peru's domestic law with the abovementioned
provision of the Convention. On the contrary, the questions posed by the Commission made no reference to that
provision, being general in nature and concerning the obligations and responsibilities of the states or individuals
that promulgate or enforce a law manifestly in violation of the Convention.
Adopted by the General Assembly of the OAS at its Ninth Regular Session, held in La Paz Bolivia, October 1979
(Resolution No. 448).
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international organizations to take part in the procedure,97 later extending this possibility
also to individuals and non-organized groups.
2. Object
According to the text of Article 64, two different types of advisory opinions are recognized,
establishing in general a very wide competence (far wider than the advisory function
provided by Protocol No. 16).
a) The Interpretation of the Convention and of Other International Treaties Concerning the
Protection of Human Rights
As a matter of fact, according to Article 64(1), the Court may be consulted regarding the
interpretation not only of the American Convention, but also of other treaties concerning
the protection of human rights in the American states. Whilst identification of the
Convention is absolutely clear, the definition of the "other treaties concerning human
rights" has been the subject of interpretation by the Court since its first advisory opinion.99
According to the ICHR, Article 64 confers "the power to interpret any treaty as long as it is
directly related to the protection of human rights in a Member State of the Inter-American
system".100 Thus, it is not necessary that the "treaty" has been adopted within the Inter-
American system or that it is a "treaty" to which only American states are parties. The
Convention does not distinguish between multilateral and bilateral treaties or between
treaties whose main purpose is the protection of human rights and those treaties, which,
though they may have some other principal object, contain provisions regarding human
rights.101
Thus, in its advisory function the Court may interpret any treaty on the protection of
human rights valid in any of the States of the OAS, even when they have not ratified the
American Convention. It is not even important whether this treaty has been conceived
See I/A Court H.R., "Other treaties" subject to the consultative jurisdiction of the Court (Art. 64 American
Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-1/82 of September 24, 1982. Series A No. 1, para. 5.
In the 2009 reform of the Rules of the Court, amicus curiae was expressly included for adjudicatory
proceedings, while for advisory proceedings the Court may authorize any person to give its opinion on the
consultation.
9 The Court was asked by the Government of Peru to interpret the phrase "or of other treaties concerning the
protection of human rights in the 'American States."' Cf. "Other Treaties," supra note 95.
100 Id. at para. 21.
101 Id. at para. 21. See PEDRO NIKKEN, LA FUNCION CONSULTIVA DE LA CORTE INTERAMERICANA DE DERECHOs HUMANOS,
MEMORIA DEL SEMINARIO: EL SISTEMA INTERAMERICANO DE PROTECCION DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS EN EL UMBRAL DEL SIGLO XXI
(2003); Buergenthal, supra note 90.
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within the framework of the Inter-American system or whether it involves one or more
non-American States.102 Consequently, the Court has interpreted international treaties like
the Convention on the Rights of the Childo0 and the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations. 104
Moreover, in interpreting the word "treaty", as indicated in Article 64, the Court has stated
that it must include other documents too, even if these are non-binding and even if they
have not been concluded following the formalities required for treaties. In this context, it
has recognized the possibility of pronouncing an advisory opinion on the text of the 1948
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, based mainly on the idea that
Member States of the OAS have agreed that the Declaration contains and defines the
fundamental human rights referred to in the Charter of the Organization itself, which
cannot be interpreted and applied as far as human rights are concerned without relating
its norms, consistent with the practice of the organs of the OAS, to the corresponding
provisions of the Declaration.105
Finally, the ICHR extended its advisory competence in interpreting the Convention or other
treaties concerning the protection of human rights to reservations attached to those
instruments, based on the idea that reservations are a part of the treaty itself.10s
102 One of the objections posed to the extension of the limits of the Court's advisory jurisdiction is the possibility
of conflicting interpretations between the Court and other organs outside the Inter-American system that might
be called upon also to apply and interpret treaties concluded outside that system. Considering that this is a
phenomenon common to all those legal systems that have certain courts which are not hierarchically integrated,
the Court considered that even a restrictive interpretation of Art. 64 would not avoid the possibility that this type
of conflict might arise. See Other Treaties, supra note 95, at para. 50.
103 See I/A Court H.R., Juridical Condition and Human Rights of the Child, Advisory Opinion OC-17/02 of August 28,
2002. Series A, No.17; I/A Court H.R., Rights and guarantees of children in the context of migration and/or in need
ofinternational protection, Advisory Opinion OC-21/14 of 19 August 2014.
104 Even if at first glance the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations is not a treaty on human rights, it does
contain important provisions on the right to information on consular notification (under Art. 36(1)(b)). The
concurrent opinion of Judge Cangado Trindade is fundamental in recognizing that this Convention can no longer
be dissociated from the international norms on human rights concerning the guarantees of the due process of
law. See I/A Court H.R., The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of
the Due Process of Law, Advisory Opinion OC-16/99 of 1 October 1999. Series A no.16.
105 See I/A Court H.R., Interpretation of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man within the
Framework of Article 64 of the American Convention on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-10/89 of 14 July
1989. Series A, no.100C 10/1989, paras. 43 and 48.
106 According to the Court, the effect of a reservation, as provided in the Vienna Convention, is to modify with
regard to the State making it the provisions of the treaty to which the reservation refers. See Restrictions to the
Death Penalty, supra note 94, at para. 45.
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b) The Interpretation of National Laws
According to Article 64(2), Member States of the Organization can activate the advisory
function of the Court by requesting opinions regarding the compatibility of any of their
domestic laws with the international instruments mentioned in Article 64(1). All OAS
Member States-and not only those party to the Convention-can consult the Court to
determine whether provisions of their domestic laws conform to the obligations they
assumed in the Convention or in other human rights treaties.
The Court has clarified that the expression "domestic law" includes legislative or
constitutional drafts.107 This is because the purpose of the ICHR advisory function is to
assist OAS Member States and organs in complying with their international human rights
obligations, and also to avoid the contentious legal process and all related sanctions. This
purpose would be frustrated if the Court could emit a decision on State legislation only
once the law entered into force. However, the Court can decide whether to admit or to
reject advisory opinion requests regarding legislative proposals, and, in doing so, it has to
bear in mind that its main purpose is to assist the requesting state in better complying with
its international human rights obligations. As a matter of fact, the Court will reject a
request in all those cases in which it would become embroiled in domestic political
squabbles, which could affect the role assigned to it by the Convention.
3. The Effects of the Decisions
The extensive interpretation developed by the ICHR and the progressive extension of its
material competence, as well as of the subjects legitimated to activate the procedure, are
the consequences of the principal and unique purpose of the advisory function itself: the
interpretation of the American Convention and of other treaties concerning the protection
of human rights in the American States. The extensive advisory jurisdiction conferred on
the Court by Article 64 of the Convention and by its judicial interpretation is unique in
contemporary international law. The advisory opinion system has created a parallel system
to the adjudicatory power of the Court by offering an alternative judicial method with
consultative nature. Its aim is to assist states and organs in applying and complying with
human rights treaties, without subjecting them to the formalism and the sanctions
associated with the contentious judicial process.'0a These considerations are fundamental
in order to clarify the framework as to the effects of advisory opinions. This is also
important because, from the effects of decisions, some considerations can be drawn
107 See I/A Court H.R., Proposed Amendments of the Naturalization Provisions of the Constitution of Costa Rica,
Advisory Opinion OC-4/84 of 19 January 1984. Series A, no. 4, on the request presented by the Government of
Costa Rica of an advisory opinion on the compatibility of a constitutional reform of Articles 14 and 15 of its
Constitution. See id. at para. 26.
10s See Restrictions to the Death Penalty, supra note 93, at para. 43.
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regarding the relationship between adjudicatory and advisory functions and regarding the
judicial dialogue in the Inter-American context.
The foregoing considerations imply that, for the Court, advisory opinions do not have the
same binding effect as adversarial decisions. However, they do have undeniable juridical
effects, and consequently the requesting State or organ is not the only party interested in
the result of the proceeding. For if a State carries out activities that the ICHR, through an
advisory opinion, has determined as incompatible with the American Convention, that
State can no longer claim to be unaware that its behavior is violating its obligations under
the Convention.109
Considering the main philosophy behind the advisory function-"assisting the American
States in fulfilling their international human rights obligations and to assist the different
organs of the inter-American system to carry out the functions assigned to them in this
field"no-the Court has a discretionary, but not arbitrary, power to comply with a request.
It can refuse every time a request for an advisory opinion has another purpose that would
weaken the system established by the Convention and that would distort the advisory
jurisdiction of the Court in a manner that would impair the rights of potential victims of
human rights violations.
The legal scholarship dealing with the effects of advisory opinions is not unanimous. Part of
it considers that the Court exercises the function, both at the adversarial and advisory
levels, of applying and/or interpreting the American Convention, thereby functioning as a
jurisdictional body and, as such, making jurisdictional decisions. According to this
scholarship, these decisions should be considered as case law, and an auxiliary source of
law in international law according to the provisions of Articles 38-59 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice. Indeed, this approach is supported by the fact that many
advisory opinions have been invoked in contentious cases.112
Nonetheless, it is also true that Article 2 of the Court's Statute distinguishes between its
jurisdictional function and its advisory function. However, part of the legal scholarship
considers that in this case the term "jurisdiction" has been used as a synonym for
"contentious."113
.o.See JORGE ERNESTO ROA, LA FUNCION CONSULTIVA DE LA CORTE INTERAMERICANA DE DERECHOs HUMANOS 96 (2015).
110 See Other Treaties, supra note 95, at para. 25.
I /d. at para. 31.
112 See NIKKEN , supra note 101.
113 Id. at 171.
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Meanwhile, another strand of legal scholarship,114 which is based on the Court's
expressions according to which in the exercise of its advisory function the Court fulfills a
consultative function through opinions, considers that they "lack the same binding force
that attaches to decisions in contentious cases.", 15
///. The Relationship Between the Advisory and the Adjudicatory Jurisdiction
One of the most delicate aspects that demands the attention of scholars studying the
possible problems of Protocol 16 is the relationship between the advisory and the
adjudicatory function. It is necessary to seek a harmonization between the two functions.
The following parts of the article set out some considerations as to how the ICHR has dealt
with the issue.
1. The Use of Advisory Opinions to Inform Decisions on Contentious Cases, as Interpretative
Criteria
In at least twenty adjudicatory cases, the Court has applied arguments taken from advisory
opinions as part of the interpretative process in contentious cases. It remains unclear
whether the Court does so because it feels bound/obliged to refer to its case law or
whether it only does so on a discretionary basis. Under the first approach, the Court would
define the effects of the advisory opinion throughout its interpretation. On one side,
advisory opinions would be considered as binding on all states, thereby representing a
horizontal precedent that could be used in contentious cases. On the other side, the Court
would not consider its advisory opinions to be binding, except when "transposed" in a
decision in an adjudicatory case. Under the latter approach, advisory opinions would only
represent subsidiary interpretative criteria, with an opinion only being converted to
international jurisprudence when the Court uses it as a basis for its decision in an
adjudicatory case. This approach would be problematic, because from the point of view of
States' international responsibility it would mean recognizing that in all those cases in
which the Court based a decision in favor or against a State on an advisory opinion, it
would be applying interpretative criteria that really are not binding on any State. Any
declaration of State responsibility would stand outside the international obligations of the
State itself, with the subsequent violation of the rights of victims.
If advisory opinions are considered to simply be part of the argumentative process
developed by the Court, then they cannot be considered binding. The latter hypothesis
appears to be the most consistent, but it is probably less tied to reality, because in fact the
114 See HrCTOR FAUNDEZ LEDEZMA, EL SISTEMA INTERAMERICANO DE PROTECCION DE LOs DERECHOs HUMANOS: ASPECTOS
INSTITUCIONALES Y PROCESALEs 450-54 (1996).
11' See Other Treaties, supra note 95, at para. 51.
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Court usually directly quotes advisory opinions when adopting certain decisions in a
proceeding.
2. The Use of Adjudicatory Jurisprudence in Advisory Opinions
If the Court uses the precedents pronounced in contentious cases in advisory opinions as
part of the decision, it would have the same consequences as we have already mentioned
with reference to the effects of an advisory opinion. The most complicated situation is
when the Court develops, in an advisory opinion, jurisprudence that has been established
in a contentious case, which happened in the advisory opinion on "Juridical Condition and
Human Rights of the Child." In this opinion, the Court not only defined the juridical
status and children's human rights in accordance with international standards, but referred
to the case Nihos de la Colle (Villagrdn Morales y otros) v. Guatemala to support the
development of rights to equality, education, and judicial guarantees for children. The
Court increased the standard of protection of their rights and imposed new obligations on
States. It might be thought that in these cases in which the interpretative principle
affirmed in an advisory opinion derives from the development of a binding precedent, that
standard is not made mandatory.
In particular, the Court's extension of its advisory jurisdiction does not imply that it is
possible to a State that is not part of the Convention a standard that is nothing else but the
development of an interpretation of an international treaty that is binding for the
requesting State. It would be possible to apply this standard given the pro persona
principle in human rights interpretation, but not for a direct application of the advisory
opinion in which it was provided.
3. The Case of States That Have Not Accepted the Court's Jurisdiction
In this context, we can consider two different options.
(1) The case in which the Court is asked to render an advisory opinion on a dispute that
could not be referred to the Court under the adjudicatory function because one of the
States had not accepted its contentious jurisdiction;
116 I/A Court H.R., Juridical Condition and Human Rights of the Child, Advisory Opinion OC-17/02 of 28 August
2002.Series A, no.17.
117 I/A Court H.R., Case of the "Street Children" (Villagr6n Morales and others) v. Guatemala, Decision of 19
November 1999, Series C No. 63.
11s See RoA, supra note 109.
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(2) The case in which the Commission, in the absence of a State's consent to the Court's
jurisdiction, seeks an advisory opinion under Article 64(1), being unable to refer the case to
the Court under the contentious jurisdiction.
As was mentioned above, the ICHR has recognized the absolute right of the Inter-American
Commission to consult the Court. According to the powers and obligations conferred upon
the Commission by the Convention, it is necessary and appropriate that it consult the
Court regarding the meaning of certain provisions, whether or not there exists an
interpretative difference between a State position and that of the Commission. The Court
has considered that only cases in which the advisory opinion request might interfere with
the proper functioning of the system of protection spelled out in the Convention, or if it
might adversely affect the interests of the victim of human rights violations, would not be
admitted."'
IV. The Dialogue
In the Inter-American context, the "dialogue" follows two main directions: judicial and
intergovernmental.120 As seen in the previous paragraphs, advisory opinions are generally
not legally binding. However, legal scholarship, Member States, and the Court itself tend to
recognize them at least at the interpretative level, and many judges have used advisory
opinions as interpretative arguments.121
However, as will be indicated below, even if State behavior has not been unanimous, the
"dialogue" with the States has been quite complicated, for several reasons. First, standards
of protection elaborated in advisory opinions are not binding on Member States. This is
u1 See Other Treaties, supra note 95. Another limit is represented by all those cases in which the advisory opinion
of the Court could produce a determination of contentious matters not yet referred to the Court, without
providing the victims with the opportunity to participate in the proceedings. Such a result would distort the
Convention system. Cf. I/A Court H.R., Compatibility of Draft Legislation with Article 8(2)(h) of the American
Convention on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-12/91 of 6 December 1991. Series A, no.12, para. 28.
120 It is necessary to underline that "judicial dialogue" within the Inter-American system has been better realized
through conventionality control and consistent interpretation. See Eduardo Ferrer Mac-Gregor, Interpretaci6n
conforme y control difuso de convencionalidad. El nuevo paradigma para el juez mexicano, 2 ESTUDIOS
CONSTITUCIONALEs 531-622 (2011).
121 In this sense, for example, the Supreme Court of Argentina in the case Simon, Julio Hector y otros s/privaci6n
ilegitima de la libertad, etc. case no. 17.768, decision of 14 June 2005, declared the unconstitutionality of two
amnesty laws (Law no. 23.492 and Law no. 23.521). For several reasons, but with an explicit reference to the
advisory opinion on International Responsibility for the Promulgation and Enforcement of Laws in Violation of the
Convention, considered as part of the Convention case law. More specifically, this opinion underlined, with direct
reference to the Convention, the general principle according to which all state organs have to comply with State
international obligations. The supreme judge of Argentina invoked this principle in order to inhibit human rights
violations committed during the military dictatorship. See De Sena, supra note 89; ROA, supra note 109, at 130 on
the application of the ICHR advisory opinion in the Constitutional Court of Colombia case law.
2015 1423
German Law Journal
due to legal conditions, but also to the extension and indeterminacy of the ICHR's
competence. Member States cannot find in advisory opinions a general source of legal
obligation, as in the case of contentious decisions, partly because the Court cannot
pronounce on State responsibility.
Whilst it is true that American States, which are also part of the Convention system, have,
in in the great majority of cases, respected advisory opinions, human rights protection
implies a higher and greater level of commitment.
It is important to underline that, in the latest advisory opinion, "Rights and guarantees of
children in the context of migration and/or in need of international protection, 122 the ICHR
stated that the interpretation given to a provision of the Convention through an advisory
opinion provides all the organs of the Member States of the OAS, including those that are
not parties to the Convention but that have undertaken to respect human rights under the
Charter of the OAS (Article 3(l)) and the Inter-American Democratic Charter (Articles 3, 7, 8
and 9), with a source that, by its very nature, also contributes, especially in a preventive
manner, to achieving the effective respect and guarantee of human rights. In particular, it
can provide guidance when deciding matters relating to children in the context of
migration and to avoid possible human rights violations. Similarly, the Court found it
necessary to recall that, pursuant to international law, when a State is party to an
international treaty, such as the American Convention on Human Rights, such a treaty is
binding on all its organs, including the Judiciary and the Legislature, so that a violation by
any of these organs gives rise to the international responsibility of the State. Accordingly,
the Court considers that the different organs of the State must carry out the corresponding
control of conformity with the Convention, based also on the considerations of the Court
in exercising its non-contentious or advisory jurisdiction, which undeniably shares with its
contentious jurisdiction the goal of the Inter- American human rights system, which is "the
protection of the fundamental rights of the human being.;;
123
Thus, advisory opinions are considered as a binding parameter for national authorities.
From now on, ignoring an advisory interpretation and implementing or maintaining the
validity of a law contrary to the interpretation set out in the advisory opinion, could
generate the international responsibility of the State before the Inter-American Court.
Although progress in determining the effects of advisory opinions has been attained, there
remains a contradiction between, on one side, the increasingly clear binding force of
advisory opinions and, on the other side, the Court's attitude of continuing to differentiate,
in this aspect, the effects of advisory opinions and the judgments in contentious cases.
122 See Rights and guarantees of children in the context of migration and/or in need of international protection,
supra note 103.
123 Id. at para. 31.
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However, it is still difficult to explain the differences between the effects of an advisory
opinion and those of a contentious decision, beyond the intrinsic characteristics of each of
the procedures. Moreover, the Court has advanced a strange understanding of its advisory
function, because the ICHR is not a higher court with the power to revoke lower court
sentences, ignoring its own precedents, and it is not even possible to talk about the value
of a precedent on a horizontal level.124
Finally, in exercising the advisory function, the Court can perform a compatibility control
between norms in force (constitutional and legal) or legislative drafts (constitutional or
legal) of States. The control of compatibility of existing rules of States with the American
Convention is analogous to the abstract and posterior control of constitutionality and the
control of compatibility of constitutional or legislative drafts is analogous to prior judicial
review. However, caution is needed here because, as has been underlined, the analogy
between the Inter-American Court and Constitutional Courts is limited since the Inter-
American Court cannot invalidate provisions contrary to the Inter-American corpus iuris.125
E. Final Remarks
If Protocol No. 16 becomes effective, the ECHR system will be aligned with most of the
supranational human rights organizations, providing for not only contentious, but also
advisory, jurisdiction.
However, because of the interaction with the existing mechanisms for the protection of
fundamental rights at the domestic as well as European levels, the effects of the protocol
might become much wider than its drafters imagined. This could result not only in the
expansion of the culture of "European rights," but also in some shortcomings. In particular,
the ECHR system could suffer asymmetries, considering not only the state of ratifications,
but also the discretion left to national authorities in selecting the courts authorized to
refer. Moreover, the new mechanism could have an effect on the existing balance between
ordinary and Constitutional Courts in fundamental rights adjudication in Europe, with the
risk of creating conflicts that, in the end, result in a decline in the level of protection of the
rights of individuals.
Protocol No. 16 could trigger an ECtHR-based centralization of interpretation and,
indirectly, of application of ECHR rights, while leaving a narrow margin of manoeuvre to
national, and in particular constitutional, judges, in the interpretation of those rights based
124AUGUSTo GUEVARA PALACIOs, Los DICTAMENES CONSULTIVOS DE LA CORTE INTERAMERICANA DE DERECHOs HUMANOS.
INTERPRETACION CONSTITUCIONAL Y CONVENCIONAL 321-22 (2012).
125 See Laurence Burgorgue-Larsen, La Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos como Tribunal Constitucional,
in IUS CONSTITUTIONALE COMMUNE EN AMERICA LATINA. RASGOS, POTENCIALIDADES Y DESAFIOs 412-57 (Hector Fix Fierro,
Mariela Morales Antoniazzi & Armin von Bogdandy eds., 2014).
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on national constitutional provisions. Hence, a reluctance in using the advisory opinion
mechanism on the part of Constitutional Courts could be foreseeable-a reluctance,
perhaps, comparable to that witnessed for many years of Constitutional Courts failing to
fulfill their duty to use the preliminary reference procedure before the CJEU. By contrast, if
the ECtHR interprets its power of docket control strictly, then the impact of the overall
mechanism on its relationship with highest courts will be almost non-existent. Indeed, the
text of the Protocol is left deliberately vague.
All in all, however, the advisory opinion mechanism in principle has the merit of allowing
Constitutional Courts to engage in the protection of fundamental rights actively in
coordination with the ECtHR, whereas heretofore such a direct link was lacking. In other
words, it is for the Constitutional Courts to decide whether, in the framework of the ECHR
system, they want to be mere recipients of the interpretation of fundamental rights
provided by the ECtHR or also agents of fundamental rights in Europe.126 The latest
developments in terms of preliminary references to the CJEU by Constitutional Courts,
which involve an increase in both the number of references and in the number of courts
involved, show that, even where the cooperation with the CJEU is mandatory according to
the EU treaties (and contrary to Protocol No. 16), in practice and despite the obligation,
Constitutional Courts have eventually decided when to use Article 267 TFEU.
As the experience of the ICHR demonstrates, a cooperative attitude of courts could help in
avoiding the possible shortcomings identified in the mechanism of Protocol No. 16.
Favorable legislation and a supportive environment have been the ingredients that have
allowed the Inter-American system to enjoy quite a wide consultative function,127 insofar
as the locus standi before the Court is concerned, as well as the number and type of
subjects on which advisory opinions from the Court may be requested, the object (i.e., the
texts on which the opinion may be requested), and the effects of the decision.
Furthermore, through the advisory opinion function, the ICHR has developed a pro-
persona interpretation, elaborating solid and advanced juridical conceptions directed at
reinforcing its advisory competence.128 However, some weaknesses have also emerged
126 See Marta Cartabia, Europe as a Space of Constitutional Interdependence: New Questions about the Preliminary
Ruling, in this Special Issue.
127 In the practice of the Inter-American Court, the adoption of advisory opinions has developed considerably
especially in the first phase of the life of the Court, primarily due to the reluctance of States to submit to the
ICHR's adversarial jurisdiction. In fact, in the period of 1982-1989, the Court has issued its first ten advisory
opinions or nearly half of those issued to date (total of twenty-one): two in 1982, one in 1983, one in 1984, one in
1985, two in 1986, two in 1987, and one in 1989. The same trend has been repeated in the early nineties (1990-
1994), when the exercise of the adversarial jurisdiction was still very sporadic.
128 In this sense, see Other Treaties, supra note 95, at para. 17, according to which with reference to Art. 64 "This
text, which was broader than any similar contemporary international provision." See also Fabian Salvioli, La
competencia consultiva de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos: marco legal y desarrollo
jurisprudencial, in HOMENAJE Y RECONOCIMIENTO A ANTONIO CAN ADO TRINDADE, T. Ill, 417-72 (S. Fabris eds., 2004).
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within the Inter-American system, which mainly stem from the uncertainty of the effects of
the decisions. At the same time, the activism of the ICHR with regard to the expansion of
its advisory competence has generated the following consequences: it questions the
international legality of obligations the Court may impose on States in those contentious
judgments constructed on arguments expressed in the advisory opinion and it makes the
practice of the Court to use arguments of contentious sources in advisory opinions
somewhat confusing. Generally speaking, the highest courts of several Latin American
countries-which, due to the characteristics of the prevalent model of constitutional
justice in that area, have also to deal with constitutional review of legislation, thereby
reflecting the U.S. model-have assumed a positive conduct.129 The result is a dynamic
interaction and a gradual reinterpretation of domestic law, without introducing a formal
change.
Finally, the success of the mechanism introduced by Protocol No. 16 will depend on the
elements analyzed in this article and concerning both the prospective attitude of
Constitutional Courts and of the ECtHR as well as the prospective contents of its advisory
opinions.
Likewise, the development of the triangular relationship between the CJEU, ECtHR, and
Constitutional Courts needs to be explored in the light of Protocol No. 16 and EU accession
to the ECHR, if and when it is achieved. From the point of view of Constitutional Courts, EU
accession to the ECHR may further complicate the functioning of Protocol No. 16, as it
would open up competing channels of communication, first of all with the EU preliminary
reference, between national and supranational courts.
As has been pointed out, the complex intertwining of the new advisory opinion mechanism
of the ECtHR and the preliminary reference procedure before the CJEU shows that there is
a missing piece in this jigsaw. These mechanisms devise inter-judicial relationships that rely
only upon the inputs of domestic courts, as if the CJEU and the ECtHR, in their respective
domains, d o not need to engage in the first place in a "conversation" with national judges,
129 This positive approach is resumed in the approach of the Constitutional Court of Peru, according to which it
has referred to the ICHR as the "ultimate guardian of rights in the region," underlining the necessity to take into
consideration its interpretation. See Constitutional Court of Peru, 17 April 2002, Cartagena Vargas, no. 218-02-
HC/TC, para. 2. The Constitutional Court of Peru considers that ICHR judgments-including advisory opinions-are
binding for all public authorities, binding nature that "is not exhausted by its operative paragraphs, but extends to
the ratio decidendi, even in those cases in which the Peruvian State has not been a party to the proceedings." Id.
at para. 36. On the same line is the Constitutional Court of Colombia. See Diego Garcia-Sayan, The Inter-American
Court and Constitutionalism in Latin America, 7 Tx. L. REV. 1835-62 (2011). For a "negative approach" in the
experiences of Argentina, Chile, and Venezuela, see Alexandra Huneeus, Rejecting the Inter-American Court:
Judicialization, National Courts, and Regional Human Rights, in CULTURES OF LEGALITY: JUDICIALIZATION AND POLITICAL
ACTIVISM IN LATIN AMERICA 112-39 (Javier A. Couso, Alexandra Huneeus, & Rachel Sieder eds., 2013).
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and particularly with Constitutional Courts. 130 Without the CJEU and the ECtHR being able
to take steps forward towards constitutional judges, some of their decisions risk being
detached from the constitutional systems from where the case arose, or risk exclusively
focusing on the protection of a right without taking other competing public interests
seriously (for example, in cases having an impact on welfare systems, still financed almost
entirely by States, and on national budgets). 13  Hence, the establishment of a system of
reverse referrals from the CJEU and the ECtHR, respectively, to Constitutional Courts,
would perhaps appear appropriate. This could be used when doubts arise about the
constitutional implications of a prospective EU or conventional judgment at the domestic
level, especially when constitutional judges have had the opportunity to have a say on the
pending case.132 This way, the declared objective of Protocol no. 16, which is to strengthen
the cooperation between highest domestic courts and the ECtHR, would be truly fulfilled,
through the putting in place of a bi-directional relationship.
130 See Marta Cartabia, Europe as a Space of Constitutional Interdependence: New Questions about the Preliminary
Ruling, in this Special Issue.
1 See, e.g., in matter of pensions, the case Da Conceig5o Mateus v. Portugal, App. Nos. 62235/12 and 57725/12,
(Oct. 8, 2013), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/, which took a different view to the Portuguese Constitutional Court in
Decision no. 353/2012. By contrast, in Decision no. 264/2012, the Italian Constitutional Court, again on pensions,
decided not to follow the judgment rendered on the same issue by the ECtHR in Maggio and others v. Italy, App.
Nos. 46286/09, 52851/08, 53727/08, 54486/08, and 56001/08, (May 31, 2011), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/. See
Cristina Fasone, Constitutional Courts Facing the Euro Crisis. Italy, Portugal and Spain in a Comparative
Perspective, MAX WEBER PROGRAMME WORKING PAPERS (2014).
132 In this context, the "Case-Law Exchange Network with Highest Courts," recently established by the European
Court of Human Rights, represents a crucial intermediate step.
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